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ABSTRACT
Substantial attention has recently been focused in North America upon the venues in
which spectator sports are played. Between 1992 and 1994, six professional football and
baseball stadia will be built in the United States, and many more concepts will at least be
given consideration. The importance of stadium planning has been given added
significance with the awarding of the 1994 World Cup soccer tournament and the 1996
Summer Olympic Games to the United States.
A least two of the stadia to be built by 1994 will be located within established
urban environments -as might several other projects currently under consideration.
Building a stadium within the developed city provides particularly challenging problems
for urban planners. These include fitting a building of such grandiosity into the urban
fabric, selecting a suitable site based on considerations of access and land use
compatibility, affecting with the sports facility the sense of the place it inhabits, and
assessing and controlling the economic impacts of the sports facility.
Two recently completed urban stadia, Toronto's SkyDome and Baltimore's Oriole
Park at Camden Yards, have drawn considerable attention due to their divergence from
previously established stadium planning conventions. As such, each is a possible
prototype for a new era in urban stadium planning. In this thesis the author will present
case studies of both facilities, and will use them in examination of the above mentioned
key issues associated with urban stadium planning.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
Professional spectator sports are an integral element of North American society. It could be argued
that no activity taking place in our cities consistently commands more attention. Few attractions
other than baseball, for example, will attract over 1 million people in 26 cities across North America
over a six month span, and will be televised to millions of others through a billion dollar television
contract.
Over the past decade, substantial attention has been focused upon the facilities in which
these sports are played. Between 1992 and 1994, six professional sports stadia will be built in cities
across the United States -in Baltimore, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Arlington, Texas, and two in
Atlanta- with at least 30 more concepts in some stage of planning.1 And with the awarding of the
1996 Summer Olympic Games to Atlanta, and 1994 World Cup Soccer matches to nine American
cities, the issue stadium planning has taken on added significance.
Three of the six stadia to be built be 1994 are certain to be located deep within urban
boundaries. And the three professional sports stadia built since 1989 are situated amidst the fabric
of their respective cities. Two of these, Toronto's SkyDome and Baltimore's Oriole Park at Camden
Yards have drawn considerable attention due to their uniqueness, and as such represent possible
new directions for urban stadium planning. The former represents an unprecedented multi-purpose
stadium. The challenge for SkyDome's planners was to advance our ideas of the modem stadium
while simultaneously moving away from the contextual ignorance that typifies almost all of the
stadia built from the Sixties to the Eighties. With its modem aesthetic and broad spectrum of
amenities, it has been designed to attract as much attention as any events inside. In contrast, Oriole
Park will be the first major league "new-old" ballpark, designed in emulation of the sensitive,
compact Golden Age ballparks of the early twentieth century. The charge for its planners and
designers was not only to replicate traditional stadium design while incorporating modem amenities,
but to design a stadium that responds to -rather than ignores- the surrounding urban context, and to
1Dell'Apa, Frank "Tagliabue Cautious on Stadium" Boston Globe Sept. 23, 1991, p. 30
replicate traditional stadia's positive impacts on the character of nearby public spaces and on the
image of the neighborhood.
One would expect that a stadium would be most disruptive when situated within a previously well
defined, established and ordered surrounding, such as that imposed by the inner city. Indeed, there
are four challenges that must be addressed in planning a stadium for the urban fabric. One is the
issue of fitting a building of such scale into the urban fabric: unlike the ballparks of the early
twentieth century, designers of most recent facilities have been unable to relate these massive
structures to the human scale of the urban environment. They have thus earned such unflattering
monikers as "cookie cutters" for their impact on established urban forms, "white elephants" for their
conspicuous grandiosity, and "Flying saucers" for their general lack of belonging.
In planning a stadium for a dense urban setting, planners also face particular challenges in
selecting a suitable site: Providing the amenities and transportation provisions that must accompany
a stadium is particularly challenging is problematic for urban environments. Few developed areas
are capable of handing the surges of traffic to and from these facilities, while the need to find a site
with compatible land uses, given the high densities of urban development, must be resolved.
There is also a question of the ability of a stadium to affect a Sense of Place. The ability of a
sports facility to influence our impressions of the place they inhabit is understood in looking at the
stadia built during the "Golden Age" of the early twentieth century. But as the concept has been lost
on designers and planners of more recently built stadia, few lay persons would even think it
possible for a stadium to enhance our definition of -or even give definition to a place.
The economic impacts are perhaps the ones most commonly considered. Although the
notion that stadia positively impact local economies is widely assumed and is used in defense of
large public expenditures on stadium projects, the actual economic benefits of stadia are being
brought into question. Furthermore, it is not clear that planners have appropriately planned areas
around stadia for "spin-offs" and other benefits.
In this thesis I will examine these problems, using SkyDome and Oriole Park as case studies. The
purpose is not to compare the two projects. Rather, as prototypes of the new urban stadium, they
will be evaluated in regards to how they address the problems of mitigating impacts of size and
scale, choosing an appropriate site, affecting a sense of place, and planning for economic benefits.
After a brief overview of the history of stadia and stadium planning in North America, each
case is presented in detail , including descriptions of the projects, the people most responsible for
their construction, the motivating factors behind their construction and chosen locations, and
impacts as assessed thus far. The four issues will are then addressed independently, with reference
made primarily to the two cases but also to other new stadium projects.
CHAPTER 1: The History of Stadium Planning in North America
Many would argue that professional sports and the sports stadium (or park) are two
quintessential elements of American culture. Indeed, the evolution of the venues in
which the 'Great American Pastime' and later football have been played reflect significant
changes experienced by our society. North Americans have witnessed changes in scale,
scope of activities, location and in dialogue with the surrounding urban setting. The
purpose of this chapter is to outline these changes and the forces that lay behind them.
The Golden Age Ballparks
Many Americans perceive professional sports as having evolved only recently from
recreational activities into an industry driven by the pursuit of profit. In fact, the impact of
the business of baseball on the planning of venues can be traced back to the most revered
era of venue construction, the Golden Age of the early twentieth century.
Until the 1860's, baseball existed as a friendly pastime, engaged in by over 200
amateur clubs 1. The concept of a stadium was not yet born, as interested onlookers found
ample room around any field or meadow in which a game might have been played. It was
not until the first professional team was formed, the 1869 Cincinnati Red Stockings, and
the first pro league founded (the National League in 1876) that baseball entrepreneurs
carried out formal efforts to attract fans and to provide adequate venues in which to
enjoy the game. The first ballparks were, however, no more than wooden grandstands,
designed to varying degrees of elaboration, stretched along the foul lines2 .
But by the turn of the century, several forces worked to increase the significance
and prominence of the baseball park. While explosive urban growth increased the market
1Neilson, Brian J. "Dialogue with the City: The Evolution of Baseball Parks", Landscape v 29, 1, 1986, p. 39
2 Neilson, p. 39
for baseball, it was the character of this new urban population that, according to some,
made the game popular and, thus, new stadium construction feasible.
Mass spectator sports offered a common focus for disparate native and
immigrant groups... [Baseball] has always furnished cultural heroes who
were less "Irish" or "German" or "Italian" than "American"... The new
ballparks are arenas in which abstractions of "citizenship", "the rules", and
"belonging" were dramatized. 3
Professional baseball not only appealed to the new immigrant sector of urban society, but
also to the newly urbanized. At a point in which the "myth of the small town" was
becoming increasingly difficult to realize with the urbanization of America, this pastoral,
expansive, and time-independent activity "reassured old-stock folk that their traditional
small-town values were still relevant to society."4
The era of Golden Age ballparks was born, in part, of efforts to reap the financial
dividends of such sentiments, as existing facilities could not sufficiently accommodate
the rapidly growing urban markets. In addition, the dangers associated with wooden,
public-gathering spaces were becoming all-too evident around the turn of the century. In
1894 alone, there were at least five fires in major-league parks. The repeated loss of parks
to fire, along with the 1903 theater fire in Chicago sensitized urbanites to the need for
stricter building codes for semi-public places.5 Advances in steel and concrete building
technologies, previously restricted to skyscraper construction, were consequently used by
14 of 16 professional teams to build much larger (more lucrative) and safer venues for the
game of baseball.6
In an era predating the affordability of the automobile, baseball businessmen
would rely heavily on the cities' growing urban transit systems and walking distance
proximity to attract the thousands need to fill these new confines. Baseball owners built
their parks on the then-urban fringe, predominately middle-class neighborhoods, where
3 Neilson, p. 40
4 Riess, Steven A.: City Games: The Evolution of Urban Society and the Rise of Sports. University of Illinois Press,
Urbana and Chicago, 1989, p. 209.
5Riess, p. 217
6Neilson, 40
Figure 1.1
Shibe Park, Philadelphia
(Ray Madeiros)
the ballparks could benefit fully from the rapid dispersion and extensions of street-car and
subway lines. Indeed, the location of the Golden Age parks was directly tied to transit
routes: Franchise owners are said to have used their extensive political connections,
coercion, and graft to learn the location of upcoming transit line extensions, and at one
point it was estimated that 15% of businessmen in baseball were traction executives. 7
Despite their location along the edges of their respective cities, the Golden Age
ballparks, reflecting an unprecedented grandeur and permanence for sporting venues,
achieved a sense of modesty by respecting sight restrictions imposed by existing
circulation routes and burgeoning residential settlement. Each stadium is therefore as
physically unique as their urban confines. The perfectly square Shibe Park, for example,
reflected the rigid perpendicular nature of the Philadelphia grid (Figure 1.1).
The respect, sensitivity, and uniqueness portrayed in the shape of each Golden
Age ballpark is equally evident at street-level, despite emphasis on functionality by
7 Riess, p. 209
''a.-
~1-~~ .O.~eefl.
Figure 1.2
Shibe Park, Philadelphia
(Taylor Publishing Co.)
323:-EBBET'S FIELD. BROOKLYN NJ v
Figure 1.3
Ebbets Field, Brooklyn,(Taylor Publishing Co.)
owners and designers 8. Almost all of the parks have external facades, for instance, which
meet the street close-up, providing no more open space between structure and street
surface than might nearby walk-ups or warehouses. Indeed, their external facades in
many cases do not parallel internal dimensions, suggesting a conscious effort to promote
the sense of public street space along the parks' edges.
This dialogue between ballpark and surroundings was enhanced in some cases by
the provision of street-level activities, such as ticket offices, souvenir stands, and pubs,
and by the use of popular local architectural styles. Shibe Park's neo-Georgian exterior
(Figure 1.2), a style used for many of the city's public buildings9, and Ebbets Field's
masonry fagade and arched windows for example (Figure 1.3), made the venues genuine
elements of their respective communities, while rendering them distinguishable among
the leagues' ballparks.
The Post-War Stadia
The Golden Age ballparks proved satisfactory for quite some time. The thirty years after
the completion of Yankee Stadium in 1923 (considered the last Golden Age facilities to
be built) witnessed only one stadium project (Cleveland Municipal Stadium). However,
beginning in 1953, fifteen major league stadia were built across the country in a twenty-
year span.
While this mid-century, or Post-War wave of stadium construction was the
product of a host of social and economic forces, the fundamental influence had been
carried over for the Golden Age: the maximization of baseball's profitability. At a time
when ballparks were in need of major renovations, and surrounding neighborhoods were
deteriorating, emerging urban centers searching for image enhancement, psychological
boosts, and national stature, courted team owners with promises of new, larger, and (most
8 Riess, p. 219
9Neilson, p. 4 3
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Figure 1.4
Jack Murphy Stadium, San Diego
(Taylor Publishing Co.)
importantly) publicly-funded stadia. The financial successes experienced by the Braves
following their move from Boston to Milwaukee in 1953 convinced league officials to
approve the moves of the Browns from St. Louis to Baltimore and of the A's from
Philadelphia to Kansas City.10 Perhaps what speaks most clearly to the profit potential of
America's emerging cities was the relocation of the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York
Giants -both historically popular and successful franchises- to Los Angeles and San
Francisco, respectively
Sports entrepreneurs were also able to prey on the enthusiasm of emerging cities
by expanding their leagues. Professional football, which experienced a rapid growth in
popularity following the war, grew from 13 to 28 teams by 1977, while the number of
10 Riess, p. 235
baseball teams expanded from 16 to 26 teams. Increased league attendance was only a
minor force behind decisions to expand, as expanded television audiences (the basis for
television contracts) and expansion fees became the prime sources of league revenues 11.
This financial force behind the growing popularity of professional football and
baseball leagues is evidenced in the facilities that were built. The value of the television
contracts, for example, forced the issue of TV viewing into the stadium design equation;
camera angles would have to be ideal and views totally unobstructed. As another
example, the loss of intimacy associated with the transition from Golden Age to Post-War
facilities is in part a function of the rise of public financing. Whereas early century
stadium and baseball team owners were one in the same, the adoption of municipal
funding and ownership arrangements has meant a differentiation between the interests of
the baseball team and the interests of the facility managers. Thus, cities such as San
Diego's Jack Murphy Stadium, for example (Figure 1.4) have sought not only to
accommodate baseball, but also activities ranging from professional football to concerts
in an effort to at least break even on their investments.
The design solution arrived at in response to these issues has been a configuration
which attempts to accommodate all such activities but in fact is not optimal for the
viewing of any: round "cookie cutters" or "concrete donuts" of immense proportions. The
potential to host infrequent -and thus highly demanded- events (including football, which
is played 10 times per season compared to baseball's 81 home games) led to design
capacities of 50,000-80,000 -well beyond the 20,00-45,000 seat range of their Golden
Age, baseball-only predecessors. Many other elements of their design serve to separate
fans from the contests, such as the use of cantilevered, recessed tiers (Figure 1.5) and the
orientation of each seat towards the center of the stadium -totally unrelated to the type of
activity taking place within.
11Riess, p. 238
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Figure 1.5
Wrigley Field, Comiskey Park, Chicago
(Philip Bess)
Some have argued that in addition, the internal arrangement of the Post-War
stadia reflects a major social transition of the time: the suburbanization of American
cities. The physical separation of box seats, pricey lower deck seats, and general
admission bleachers signified the "rise and dispersal of the earlier working class" 12, and
the use of space to distinguish and separate socio-economic groups.
Congruent with the internal suburban character and lost intimacy of stadia during
this Post-War era was the loss of external attractiveness and association with the urban
context. Not only because their massive, circular forms contrast sharply with the
12 Neilson, p. 45
geometry of the urban networks, but also because of their orientation towards the
automobile -the tool of suburbanization. Increased personal mobility freed stadium
builders in the 1950's, 60's, and 70's from considering only those sights accessible by
transit; while exploding demand for stadium parking (a function of the audiences' shift to
the expansive, auto-oriented suburbs) has prevented their situation within the developed
city. Thus by 1970, 20% of all football and baseball facilities were located in the
suburbs13
The suburban sense of the Post-War stadium is perhaps witnessed best in cases
where these prototypes were in stamped into the cityscape. In such cases, the stadia
virtually ignore the preexisting urban boundaries. Busch Stadium for example consumed
9 blocks of downtown St. Louis (Figure 1.6). Accommodating these imposing facilities
therefore massively disrupted established patterns of land use, activity, and circulation.
As writer Brian Neilson has suggested, the Post-War inner-city stadia have "burst the
confines of urban history". 14
This sense is all too perceivable at street level. For many of these facilities, such
as Atlanta Fulton County Stadium (Figure 1.7), a relationship with the surrounding city
and streets is precluded by their burial in an asphalt grave. And those situated in close
confines present awkward, curved fagades that peel away from surrounding streets;
emphasizing the fact that unlike most urban structures, their configuration is totally
independent of surrounding buildings and thoroughfares. Athletic facilities were being
conceived as freestanding objects15 amidst urban environments that had been defined by
social, physical, and economic interrelations.
The adoption of a standard architectural style over local vernaculars has served to
perpetuate both the Post-War stadia's lack of belonging and their anonymity. The Post-
War era, however, saw an abandonment of individual architectural style as each stadium
13 Riess, p. 241
14Neilson, p. 45
15Lowry, Philip A. Green Cathedrals. Society for American Baseball Research, Cooperstown, NY 1986, p.9
Figure 1.6
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Figure 1.8
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sought an identical level of simplicity and functionality, characterized by massive
concrete columns, exposed circulation ramps, and a total absence of human scale
articulation (Note Figure 1.7)."Modern ballparks" as the late former Commissioner of
Baseball contended, "are the most conventional architecture since Mussolini's social
realism. "16
The view from inside further enhances the Post-War stadia's disassociation with
their respective cities. Unlike their Golden-Age predecessors, in which skylines and
16Agnell, Roger "The Sporting Scene: Celebration" The New Yorker, Aug. 22, 1988, p 56
townhouse roofs loom over the outfield walls, giving the parks definition and identity
(Figure 1.8), the total enclosure of the Post-War doughnuts severs connections between
the fans, the game, and the city. "I stand at the plate in Philadelphia", said former player
Richie Hebner, "and I don't honestly know whether I'm in Pittsburgh, St. Louis, or
Philly."17
The Modern Stadia
The most recent phase of stadium construction is in most regards an extension of the
Post-War era. There are, however, some factors which render this era distinct.
With the continued proliferation of stadia through the Post-War era, market
conditions would suggest that economics could not realistically be considered a
motivating factor behind continued stadium construction, despite public officials claims
to the contrary. While the most recent stadia have -like their predecessors- been built on
promises of economic benefits, some argue that a scenario has evolved in which too many
stadia are pursuing too few events for facilities not to lose money. Furthermore, it is
argued, stadia can no longer rely on revenue through regular tenants, such as football and
baseball teams: the growth in the number of professional-caliber facilities well beyond
the number of franchises has created a tenants market in which teams may force
inexpensive lease arrangements by threatening to relocate to another city 18.
Indeed, recent stadium projects, according to economist Robert Baade, have been
driven by the supposed image conveyed by the presence of a professional sports
franchise. It could be argued that professional franchises have been used since their
inception to define North America's high-order, "Big League" cities. But with the
continuing urbanization of North America, there has evolved more viable population
bases than franchises, leading to competition for the badges of honor that are sports
17 Knack, Ruth, "Stadiums: The Right Game Plan?" Planning, October, 1986, p. 11
1 8Baade, Robert "Is There an Economic Rationale for Subsidizing Sports Stadiums?" Heartland Policy Study, The
Heartland Institute, #13, Feb. 23, 1987, p. 7 -10
teams. Building a stadium as a franchise magnet therefore became a supposedly viable
means of image enhancement.
In addition to providing satisfactory confines for these representatives of the urban
image, the stadia themselves have also become a means by which a city's image is
arguably affected, as evidenced by the one aesthetic feature that defines the modem
stadium -the dome. While some have argued that the construction of eleven domed stadia
between 1977 and 1993* speaks to their "financial... acceptance"19 and to the fact that
covered stadia will guarantee larger crowds, a greater conceivable range of tenants, and
the plausibility of sporting events year-round for even the most inclement cities, the sheer
cost of their construction and maintenance belies, according to others, any economic
rationale for their construction. In fact, Baade argues, "[domed stadiums] have become a
symbol of urban success and prestige", 20 - a symbol so powerful that it overrules the
reality of $5 million annual operating debts.21
Many of these stadia are indeed quite striking -serving as landmarks and as the
defining element for many urban landscapes. Unfortunately however, many of the
modem era urban stadia were designed as physical and aesthetic continuations of the
Post-War prototype -equally lacking in notions of unique design, human scale, and
contextual sensitivity. Their isolation from the elements with which their neighboring
land uses must cope -while technologically intriguing- is conceivably an exacerbation of
the diminishing perceivable relationship between the athletic facility and the urban
environment.
New Directions
* Figure includes Atlanta's Georgia Dome, under construction at the time of this writing
19de Flon Rick: "Design for Leisure ", Architectural Record June, 1991, p. 58
2 0 Steacy, Anne "Domes of Distinction", MacLean's. June 12, 1989, p. 46
2 1Baade, p. 5
While it has been in municipalities best interests economically to build multi-purpose
facilities, the Post War and Modern solutions have ultimately proven to be unsuccessful;
scheduling conflicts and sub-optimal (and therefore less lucrative) seating arrangements
have forced both baseball and football tenants to escape to single-use facilities. Within a
five year span during the 1980's, four football teams relocated to football-only facilities,
while baseball's commissioner concluded in 1986 that "it is baseball's desire to see their
franchises play in stadiums that are built for baseball." 22 Thus, based on the models of
multi-purpose stadia that had been provided, it had been concluded that the best scenario
would be for football and baseball teams to play in their own facilities.23
Enclosed stadia have, in addition, experienced substantial problems with their
initially awe-inspiring roofs. Although their high construction costs have been absorbed
by municipalities in the past, the escalation of construction costs and a history of annual
operating deficits "have galvanized taxpayer resistance to such projects."24 Furthermore,
the types of domes available have not proven to be satisfactory. The earliest, solid-roof
concepts have not only result in dungeon-like interior character that is unpleasant for
patrons, but have been accused of further undermining the economic feasibility of several
projects. The economic failings of the Louisiana Superdome are a function of its inability
to attract a baseball team (as had been planned for initially), while the Seattle Kingdome,
another concrete-roof facility, has consistently drawn below average baseball crowds and
is in danger of losing the franchise only twenty years after its opening. It is not clear that
subsequent air-supported and cable-supported fabric roof concepts provide adequate
alternatives. Expensive mechanical difficulties of the former, including lack of durability,
energy inefficiency, and even deflation, have tended to override any benefits, while the
only operational cable-roof structure, the St. Petersburg Sun-Coast Dome, has been
unable to attract a long-term tenant in the four years since its construction.
2 2 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., American Sports Associates, URS Corporation: Report on Phase 1: Evaluation of
Stadium Site and Design Alternatives , Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Company, Dec. 1, 1986, p. 40
2 3 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., Dec. 1, 1986, p. 40
2 4Baade, p. 5
Stadium design is thus on the verge of a new era, as two recently completed
stadium projects have sought to provide resolutions in response to these shortcomings.
Baltimore's Oriole Park at Camden Yards embodies all of the stadium criteria set out by
former Baseball Commission Peter Uberroth, including natural grass, and a seating
capacity appropriate for baseball (roughly 40,000),25 and in addition provides all of the
amenities and luxuries common to most modem facilities. The ballpark reaches back even
further though, packaging these niceties in a quirky, intimate interior, and a distinct yet
modest exterior that are reminiscent of the revered ballparks of the Golden Age.
Toronto's SkyDome, on the contrary, implores us to further consider the concept
of the multiple-use facility, suggesting that the idea has not been taken to its limits. With
technical wizardry, SkyDome is able to overcome the previously stifling dilemmas of
having to choose between either permanent exposure or enclosure, and of having to
submit to fixed, sub-optimal seating arrangements. This unprecedented flexibility,
combined with an awe-inspiring program force SkyDome well beyond the vision of
multi-purpose and domed stadia to which we have become accustomed to the past twenty
years.
25 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., Dec. 1, 1986, p.39
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Figure 2.1
Camden Yards and Vacinity
(RTKL Associates, Inc.) _____________________
Few stadium projects have been as eagerly awaited as Baltimore's Oriole Park at Camden
Yards, which opened in April of 1992 after four years of planning. Before ground had
even been broken, baseball critics were convinced that Oriole Park, with its period
architecture, and Golden Age-like asymmetry was enough to usher in a new era of ballpark
stadium design. Urban design critics were equally enthusiastic, convinced that the ballpark
has single-handedly toppled the era of the the sleeping giant sports stadium.
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Figure 2.2
Camden Station as seen from Howard St.
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
Figure 2.3
Camden Warehouse as seen from the East
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
I I
Yet the significance of the Oriole Park project goes well beyond its aesthetic
elegance. The decision to locate a stadium dowtown, questions of functional compatibility
with downtown uses, and blending such an historically ominous land use into the urban
fabric -both funtionally and aethetically- were among the key planning problems that had to
be addressed. The purpose of this chapter will be to detail these and other planning
challenges associated with the Oriole Park project, and to outline the influences associated
with each.
Camden Yards Site and Context
Located on the western fringe of the city's central business district (CBD), Baltimore's
Camden Yards site is bound by Russell Street to the west and Interstate 395/Howard Street
to the east -both of which connect to Interstate 95 to south- and by Camden Street to the
north and the Middle Branch of the Patapsco River to the south (Figure 2.1). Martin
Luther King Boulevard bisects the site above grade, while Hamburg and Ostend Streets
also pass over the site from east to west.
Camden Yards has historically functioned as an industry and transportation hub for
the City. Although originally subdivided for residences as part of the 1729 founding of
Baltimore Town, the emergence of the railroad during the mid 1800's quickly changed the
character of the area. Twenty five years after the 1830 construction of the nation's first
railroad station less than a mile from the site, Camden Station was built on the site's
northeast corner. (See Figures 2.1 & 2.2). When fully completed, it was for a time the
largest train station in the United States. 1 The railyards and related uses continued to
expand through the turn of the century2, further delineating the indusrial character of the
area. A major element of this growth was the Camden Warehouse, constructed in segments
1RTKL Associates, Inc.: Master Plan Progress Report: Camden Yards Sports Complex
Development Plan for the Maryland Stadium Authority, Nov. 8, 1988, p. 2.9
2 RTLK Associates, Inc., p. 2.9
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Figure 2.4
Street reconfiguration as part of the 1970 Camden Urban Renewal Project(City of Baltimore Dept. of Housing and Community Development)
between 1889 and 1905 (Figure 2.3). Both the station and warehouse remain on the site to
this day.
As industry expanded, the quality of life in the residential neighborhoods west of
the warehouse declined consistently over the first half of the twentieth century. Citing an
incorrigible mix of residential and inharmonious land uses, and a majority of structures that
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Figure 2.5
Market Center West, 2 blocks north of Oriole Park
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
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Figure 2.7
Ridgley's Delight, directly across Russell St. from Oriole Park
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
were sub-standard, the City in 1970 implemented an urban renewal plan that led to the
acquisition and clearance of 22 blocks of developed urban fabric 3. In place of the two
hundred year old street grid, the City re-subdivided the property in a fashion most suitable
for -and attractive to- light industrial uses (Figure 2.4). Light manufacturing and related
uses persisted on site up until their displacement by the stadium project.
Camden Yards is surrounded by a diverse set of activities. The area directly north of
Camden Yards, Market Center West, is characterized by a mix of low-end residential,
commercial, and retail activity (Figure 2.5). The area is in a state of deterioration, with little
demand for space and structures in various degrees of blight. The city approved an urban
3 Department of Housing and Community Development: Urban Renewal Plan, Camden Industrial
Park. Project MD R-1, June 1, 1970, p. 18,19
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Figure 2.8
Devlopment opportunities near Oriole Park:
Figure 2.9
Inner Harbor West, Camden Yards in the background
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
renewal plan for the area in 1984, with the objective of establishing "a positive and
identifiable image for the neighborhood." 4
Directly east and west of Camden Yards are two historically significant residential
neighborhoods that bound the ballpark's eastern and western edges (Figure 2.6).
Immediately across Russell Street to the west is Ridgely's Delight (Figure 2.7), a currently
middle-income neighborhood that, as one of Baltimore's original neighborhoods, has been
designated as a National Register Historic District. One block to the east of the ballpark site
is the Otterbein neighborhood, a Baltimore City Historic District.5 The area boasts many
other historic places and landmarks in addition to Ridgely's Delight, Otterbein, and the on-
site features (Figure 2.6). These include four other neighborhoods recognized by the
National Register within 1/2 mile of the Camden Yard site; the Bromo Seltzer Tower, a
local landmark built in 1911; and Babe Ruth's Birthplace, located in Ridgely's Delight and
now operating as a baseball museum.
While the area surrounding Camden Yards has continued to convey a historical
significance, the ballpark site is also proximal to areas that have undergone extensive and
rapid transformations. Immediately across Howard and Camden Streets from Camden
Yards is the Inner Harbor West, the product of an urban renewal plan first initiated in 1971
(Figures 2.8 & 2.9). Covering 68 acres over 12 blocks, the area has become a focus of
Baltimore's business and commercial activities. The area currently holds nearly 1 million
SF of office and retail space and four hotels with total of 1525 rooms 6.
In conjunction with these, Inner Harbor West also features the city's two main
exhibit spaces. Two blocks from Camden yards is the 147,000 square foot Convention
Center, located at the eastern terminus of Camden Street (Figure 2.8, A). Immediately to its
4 Department of Housing and Community Development: Urban Renewal Plan. Market Center
West. June 19, 1984, p.3
5 RTLK Associates, Inc., p. 2.10
6 Center City-Inner harbor Development, Inc., p.8
26
Figure 2.10
The Inner Harbor
(Baltimore Development Corporation)
west is Festival Hall, a 52,000 SF movable structure designed to host community and
cultural exhibitions (Figure 2.8, B). In addition to existing activities, future development
within Inner Harbor West will ultimately occupy the four parcels immediately adjacent to
the ball park site (Figure 2.8, lots 1-3) and the current Festival Hall site).
To the east of the Inner Harbor West is the city's much heralded Inner Harbor, the
jewel of Baltimore's 1964 30-year City Redevelopment Plan (Figure 2.10). Covering three
sides of the basin, the objective of the joint public-private venture was to recapture the
water as a public amenity, and to turn the harbor into a playground for Baltimoreans. 7 The
7 Wrenn, Douglas M.: Urban Waterfront Development, Urban Land Institute, Washington, DC,
1983, p. 149
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The Inner Harbor is also home to Harborplace (Figure 2.10, D), a 250,000 SF
collection of specialty retail, restaurants, and food oriented merchants. Located strategically
a the northwest hub of the Inner Harbor, Harborplace is able to boast a maritime theme
while connecting to the adjacent downtown office district and Convention Center.
Surrounding the southern portion of Camden Yards are industrial lands remnant of
the 1970 Camden Industrial Park plan (Figure 2.11). This is a particularly intensive
industrial area, characterized by traditional medium-sized manufacturing firms and by such
CBD-oriented industries as elevator service and restaurant supply,9 and currently employs
5,500 persons. 10
Elements of the Camden Yards Project
The Camden Yards sports complex is comprised of several features (Figure 2.12).
In addition to the ballpark (Oriole Park), Camden Station and Warehouse have been
retained. The complex also consists of a rail platform adjacent to the east of the warehouse,
and a 5,000 car parking lot south of Martin Luther King Boulevard.
In examining the physical qualities of the complex, it is clear that every element of
its design and planning was guided by fundamental principles of sensitivity for and
responsiveness to the site's physical and historical context -best evidenced in the shape of
the ballpark (Figure 2.13). In respecting the close confines that define the urban
environment, designers shaped the park as they would most urban buildings: first in
respect of the existing boundaries imposed by the urban fabric and only then in response to
internal requirements. Thus, like the ballparks of the early century, Oriole Park's
configuration is defined by adjacent roadways (Camden Street and Russell Street). But
unique to this ballpark is the restriction imposed by the Camden Warehouse on the eastern
edge of the park. While planners did consider demolishing the warehouse, to leave it in
9 Baltimore City Department of Planning: Draft: Strategies for the Middle Branch Industrial
Areas, August 31, 1990 p.8
10 Baltimore City Department of Planning, August 31, 1990, p.8
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Figure 2.12
Oriole Park at Camden.Yards
(Maryland Stadium Atithority & Department of Transportation
place they concluded, would testify to the ballpark's sensitivity and would ensure a Golden
Age-like idiosyncracy.
The ballpark's designers also gave considerable attention to the question of how its
external appearance might respond to the site's history and how it help mitigate impacts of
scale. In the spirit of the Golden Age ballparks, they designed extensive pedestrian-scale
details for the structure's facade; the result being, in some critic's view, a stadium that
looks like a local building (Figures 2.13 & 2.14).11 The ballpark boasts a masonry skin
punctured with arched openings, reflective of the area warehouse vernacular, that wrap
around even the typically ominous switch-back ramps. (Figure 2.15). The nostalgic sense
of the exterior is further enhanced by cornice lines and step-backs -applied in an effort to
11 Goldberger, Michael: "A Radical Idea: Baseball as It Used to Be." The New York Times, Sept.
19, 1989, p. H3
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Figure 2.14
Oriole Park's King Boulevard elevation
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
relate the ballpark to the smaller scale neighborhood buildings- and by the exposed green
steel lattice-work. 12. Indeed, in looking at the ball park one is impressed by its modesty
relative to stadia of the past decades.
In addition to a sensitive architectural approach, Oriole Park's designers followed a
fundamental set of urban design principles; implemented to ensure that the ballpark respond
to the unique opportunities provided by the urban site, and to create a sense of connection
between the ball park and the city. Some of these guidelines are in response to the ballparks
siting within a tight urban street grid. Within the site, the ball park was located along its
northern-most edge for example, in order that it define street edges along Camden and
12 Smith, Janet-Marie; Vice President of Stadium Planning and Development, The Baltimore
Orioles, Inc., Conversation, January 23, 1991
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Figure 2.15
Oriole Park's switchback ramps are hidden beneath its facade
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
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Figure 2.16
Oriole Park's streetwall along Camden Street
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
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Figure 2.17
Proposal for a public Square at Russell and Camden Streets
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
Russell Streets (Figure 2.16), and reinforce the sense of open space at the intersection of
the two streets (Figure 2.17).
Other principles designed the help the ball park responds to the street fabric include
providing signature elements at points where the ball park terminates view corridors
(Figure 2.18), and respecting and maintaining the Eutaw Street corridor on site (Figure
2.19). This pedestrian concourse is a key element of the project, as it helps to softens the
distinction between city and stadium site.
The molding of the ballpark in response to it surroundings is further reflected in the
park's internal character. Indeed, Oriole Park has many of the quirky features common to
the 70 year-old, tight-fit ballparks. These including narrow foul territories, a playing field
that is asymmetrical and an outfield wall that, in response, varies in height, and the
wrapping of all bleacher levels around only one foul pole. All of these features serve to
remind fans of the urban environmental constraints to which the ballpark is subject.
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Figure 2.18 a-iFOOTBALL SIT nd
Signature details are used to terminate views MIDDLE BRANCH
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
Figure 2.19
Eutaw Street concourse
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
Figure 2.20
Baltimore's skyline rises over the outfield
(Washington Post)
Perhaps the most awesome aspect of the fan experience will be the view beyond the
outfield (Figure 2.20). Immediately past the right field wall looms the warehouse, and
beyond it the skyline of downtown Baltimore -like its Golden Age predecessors, forging a
visual connection that will further distinguish the ballpark as a unique, urban place.
Although the stadium's planners have devoted a great deal of attention on the aesthetic and
physical responsiveness of the Camden Yards complex to its environment, so too have they
focused on how the facility could be functionally integrated into the urban context. While
the warehouse, for example, was retained to define both internal and external appeal of
Oriole Park, its program of uses will serve to blur the distinction between the site and the
city. The Eutaw Street corridor separating the ballpark and warehouse will open outside of
event times in order to give the public access to the warehouse's ground floor commercial
uses and top-floor dining area; thus giving the site a life beyond the ballpark's scheduled
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Figure 2.21
Eutaw Street corridor, the ballpark on the left, Camden Warehouse on the right
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
Figure 2.22
Platforms for commuter rail and Baltimore's new LRT
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
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Figure 2.23 ,
Football stadium planned for Camden Yards
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
Figure 2.24
Conceptual drawing of air rights development over Camden Yards' rail platforms
(Ayers/Saint/Gross, Inc.)
events (Figure 2.21). The warehouse also links functionally to the downtown by providing
nearly 400,000 SF of office space.
The functional relationship between the stadium site and the city is further
established with the on-site provision of transportation facilities (Figure 2.22). East of the
warehouse is a rail platform that as the terminus for the Baltimore-Washington commuter
train and as a stop along the city's new light-rail transit (LRT). Clearly, these facilities
enhance the accessibility of the site for the city and region, but will also form the front door
for city visitors, and will be used heavily by the traveling to and from the nearby CBD.
While the planning and design of the baseball park, warehouse, and transportation facilities
comprise a substantial undertaking, they only represent the first phase of the Camden Yards
project. Conditional plans have also been laid for a football stadium that will be constructed
on the south of Martin Luther King Boulevard if the city is awarded a football franchise
(Figure 2.23). There are also plans for air-rights development over the rail platforms east of
the warehouse (Figure 2.24).
The People Involved in the Camden Yards Project
The person most directly responsible for the construction of a new stadium in Baltimore
was the late Edward Bennett Williams, former owner of the Baltimore Orioles. In 1986, at
the end of a three year lease for the thirty year old Memorial Stadium, Williams announced
that he would only continue to sign leases for the facility on a year-to-year basis. This
meant that he, or whoever might subsequently own the team would have the option of
moving the team to another city without penalty.
Thus, like so many American sports franchise owners before him, Williams was
able to parlay the fears of losing the Orioles into a new facility. With the precedent of
publicly funded sports franchises firmly in place, the onus was put to the State Government
and Governor William Donnell Schaeffer to build a new stadium. They responded by
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voting to fund a project through the issuance of $155 million in taxable and tax-exempt
revenue bonds and through the use of $50 million worth of state lottery funds. They also
created the Maryland Stadium Authority (the MSA), who's sole mission would be to guide
planning and construction of the professional sports facilities they deemed necessary for
metropolitan Baltimore.
While it was Williams who forced the construction of the new stadium, it was the
teams subsequent owner, Eli Jacobs who would determine stadium's aesthetic. After
buying into Williams' agreement for an outdoor, baseball-only facility, Jacobs, who has a
strong affinity for urban design issues, was concerned as much about the stadium's design
as he was about its function, and was determined to ensure that a decidedly traditional,
urban ballpark be built. Jacobs thus hired urban designer Janet-Marie Smith, charging here
with representing the franchises position in collaborating with the Stadium Authority and
with the project architects, Hellmuth, Obata, and Kassabaum, Inc. Indeed, Smith would be
the force behind the ballparks design; applying Jacobs principals to decisions ranging from
seat color to the use of a steel superstructure (as opposed to reinforced concrete). "Janet-
Marie Smith has, more than anyone, determined what the stadium is going to look like." 13
Motivation: Why the Stadium was Built
The fundamental impetus behind the construction of Baltimore's new stadium was a fear
that the city would otherwise lose the team. Williams decision to sign leases on an annual
basis was an ultimatum to the City and State: Memorial Stadium was no longer an
acceptable long term home for his franchise, and he wished to reserve the option of
relocating to the most suitable alternative, whether or not it be in Baltimore.
In order to truly appreciate its strength and significance though, one must put
William's threat in historical perspective. The City and State's politicians, sports
13 Paull, Evans, Executive Planner, Strategic Planning Division, The City of Baltimore Planning
and Development Department, Conversation, Jan. 23, 1992
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enthusiasts, and business community were still reeling from two very similar loses.
Immediately after the sports media crowned Baltimore the "City of Champions", the city
was jolted by the departure of the National Basketball Association's Baltimore Bullets
following their 1970 championship season. The loss was a disappointment in its own right,
but of equal importance to the city and state leaders was the precedent that the move set for
the remaining two franchises, the football Colts and baseball Orioles. The community thus
perceived a need to ensure that their two remaining professional franchises, the football
Colts and baseball Orioles, were satisfied with their facilities.
To this end, in 1972 the State Legislature created the Maryland Sports Complex
Authority, to which it gave the task of assessing whether Baltimore needed a new stadium
and, if so, what would be the optimal type and location. The Stadium Authority's findings
reaffirmed the fears of the business community: if something was not done to upgrade the
city's professional sports facilities, they stood to lose another of its two remaining
professional franchises. Their recommendation to build a new domed stadium complex
was, however, never acted upon; and indeed their concerns would be realized a decade
later. With no concerted efforts to build a stadium in Baltimore following the Sports
Complex Authority's recommendation, Robert Irsay, owner of the Colts, moved the team
in 1984 into an new domed stadium in Indianapolis.
Thus within 15 years the City of Baltimore had lost two of its three franchises-the
loss of only one being an unpleasant stigma for any city. "Rightly or wrongly, it's in a lot
of people's minds, that 'because the largest and most successful cities have pro-sports
teams, if you don't have them, then that makes you a notch below'". 14 Not surprisingly,
the loss of the Colts triggered numerous stadium studies in response to fears of losing the
one remaining franchise, the Orioles. Study groups included the Memorial Stadium
Modernization Committee, the Maryland Sports Advisory Commission on Professional
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14 CIine, conversation, 1992
Sports and the Economy, and the Baltimore Corporate Task Force. 15 While each group
sought to propose the optimal solution, they reached quite disparate recommendations
concerning the type of stadium that ought to be built, its location -and whether a new
stadium should even be built. The stadium planning efforts were numerous, but suffered
from a lack of focus. 16 Williams thus quickly brought attention and a need for focus by
giving credence to city and state's fear of losing its third and sole remaining team.
The fundamental question therefore facing the MSA was what type of facility (or facilities)
to build. Although there were potentially two tenants to serve (depending on whether the
city was awarded a football franchise by the NFL), the notion of a dual purpose stadium
was not attractive. As pointed out by Edward Cline, Deputy Director of the Maryland
Stadium Authority (and as mentioned in Chapter 1), dual-purpose stadia barely 20 years
old were proving unsatisfactory for tenants -particularly football clubs.
Furthermore, Cline adds, it made little sense to spend money on a more expensive
dual purpose stadium (relative to a baseball-only facility) when the city wasn't assured of
having a football team. In assessing the costs and benefits of building a multi-purpose
stadium, consultants to the Stadium Authority concluded that of the estimated $175 million
cost of a multi-purpose stadium, roughly $41 million would be associated with ensuring
the stadium's dual-tenancy capabilities. 17 This money would be wasted were the city not
awarded a football franchise in the future; a likely outcome given the mentioned
dissatisfaction of football franchises with dual-purpose stadia. On the other hand, two
stadia (the football stadium being built only after a franchise was awarded to Baltimore)
could be built for $11,755,000 over the cost of a dual purpose stadium- a fraction of the
$41 million that would be wasted on a dual purpose stadium were a football team not to
15 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., American Sports Associates, URS Corporation: Volume 1:
Report on Phase 2, Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. , Feb. 2, 1987, p.1-2
16 Cline Edward, Deputy Director, Maryland Stadium Authority, conversation, Jan. 22, 1992
17 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. et al.,Feb. 2, 1987, p.23
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locate there. 18 As Cline views it then, "if [the Stadium Authority] built a baseball stadium
and never got football, then we were really saving money."19
Ultimately, the Stadium Authority decided that separate football and baseball
facilities be constructed. Doing so would most likely ensure that their two objectives -of
providing a satisfactory, long-term home for the Orioles, and of providing a facility most
likely to attract a football franchise- would be achieved.
Factors Behind the Decision to Locate Downtown
In addition to deciding the type -indeed types- of facilities to be built, the Maryland
Stadium Authority reviewed host of site suitability analyses conducted during previous
stadium initiatives in efforts to determine the optimal location for the state's complex. From
these reports, three sites stood out to the Stadium Authority as the leading candidates (in
addition to the existing Memorial Stadium). These included two suburban sites (Figure
2.25) Nursery Road, Landsdowne, and the Camden Yards site adjacent to the Central
Business District. Ultimately, there were several key areas of concern in which -perhaps
surprisingly- Camden Yards was decisively more attractive that the suburban locations.
Vehicular Access
In reviewing the materials used by the Maryland Stadium Authority in its
evaluation of stadium alternatives, it seems clear -though perhaps surprising- that the
Camden Yards site was the most attractive of the alternatives with regards to vehicular
access. In terms of costs, logistics of implementation, and regional impacts, the existing
vehicular infrastructure made the site in the opinion of the Stadium Authority, the most
logical location for a stadium.
18 Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. et al., Feb. 2, 1987,p. 1
1 9 Cline, conversation, 1992
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Memorial Stadium and the site's considered for Baltimore's new stadium
(Rummel, Klepper & Kahl)
Of the sites given serious consideration by the Stadium Authority, the Nursery
Road site perhaps most typifies the traditional suburban site. In addition to its central
location relative to the regional market (that includes Washington, DC to the south), the site
was undeveloped, on the fringe of residential development, bound by a state 4-lane
highway, and near an intersection of two Interstate freeways. Data reported by the
Department of Transportation, however, suggests that the site is deceptive with regards to
its actual accessibility. Twenty major off-site access improvements that would have been
required in order to provide truly sufficient access to the site. The scale of these
improvements s would have covered the spectrum, from $60,000 road widenings to $3.6
million road realignments, and would have totaled (in 1986) $32 million. In addition,
estimates of the Nursery Road access improvements were predicated on Interstate
improvements that were deemed necessary -regardless of the stadium's construction- but
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would be mandatory if a stadium were to be located on the site. These improvements would
have cost an estimated $120 million.20
An examination of the analysis of the other suburban site, Landsdowne brings
similar findings. Although the site is located near two freeways (again a seemingly ideal
scenario), extensive off site improvements totaling $25 million would have been necessary
to prepare the site for such intense usage as a stadium. Furthermore, the $120 million in
needed Interstate improvements would also have been required prior to construction a
stadium in this location21 .
While these costs might be rationalized by considering the scale and type of facility
being sited, an analysis of similar estimates for Camden Yards reveals quite different
findings. And it is here that we first encounter a recurring theme in the site selection
process: because of its central location, Camden Yards already had much of the needed
infrastructure in place that, according to the Maryland Stadium Authority would be required
to support a major stadium, including proximity to a major highway. Two stadium studies,
the DOT analysis, and the New Stadium Site Evaluation 22 (conducted two years earlier)
concluded that eight off-site access improvements would be required in order to properly
service a stadium at the Camden Yards site, at estimated costs of $15.8 million and $13
million respectively23.
As with the suburban sites given consideration, estimates of Camden Yards access
upgrades also assumed implementation of improvements deemed necessary independent of
the stadium. In the Camden Yards case however, these costs were estimated to be minimal:
expansion of Interstate 95, passing near the site, to four lanes (within the existing right of
2 0 Rummel, Klepper & Kahl (RKK), The Wilson T. Ballard Company; JHK & Associates:
Baltimore Stadium Access Studv.Prepared for the Maryland Department of Transporation, Nov.
14, 1986 , p. H-2
2 1 RKK, p. s-1
2 2 RKK, p.s-1
2 3 RKK, p s-1
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way) for $2 million, and reconstruction of two vehicular overpasses traversing the site at an
estimated cost of $10 million.
This discrepancy in scope, scale and cost of required improvements between the downtown
and suburban alternatives would, according to Mr. Cline of the Stadium Authority, the
crucial factor in the final site selection.24
Site options also diferred with respect to anticipaated returns on investment.
Improvements at both the Landsdowne and Nursery Road site would have taken 10 years
according to DOT estimates.25 At the earliest then (given the 1986 completion of the cited
site evaluations) the improvements would have been competed by 1996 -four years after the
target date for the opening of the new stadium. Furthermore, it was the opinion of the
Secretary of Transportation that "the local highways would not operate at an acceptable
level of service between the stadium completion date and the mid- 1990's."26 In fact, the
realities of acquiring both community and Federal Highway Administration approval for
these improvements would have undoubtedly delayed their implementation by at least a
decade -if not permanently- given the staunch opposition to widening of the suburban-area
highways and to private access from Federal highways, respectively.
Along with questions of when upgrades would pay off are questions as regarding
who they would actually benefit. The costly access improvements to remote suburban sites
would have little utility for anyone other than stadium patrons. The DOT report even
suggested that improvements to the Nursery road and Landsdowne site would likely be
closed outside of stadium event times.27 As state and federally funded capital projects,
these investments would have represented a public investment into facilities providing only
a semi-public service -that is, to stadium-patrons. Conversely, the less costly
2 4 Cline, conversation, 1992
2 5Hellmuth, W.K.: Letter to H.J. Belgrad, Chairman of the Maryland Stadium Authority,
November 14, 1986. In Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co., American Sports Associates, URS
Corporation : Report on Phase 1: Evaluation of Stadium Site and Design Alternatives , Peat
Marwick, Mitchell & Company Dec. 1, 1986 p. 5
2 6 Hellmuth, W.K, Exhibit 2, p.5
2 7 RKK, p. 2
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improvements for Camden Yards would also benefit stadium patrons28 but, in many cases
would also benefit the general public; since many of the poposed improvements were
merely upgrades of facilities used by thousands of drivers every day.
The Camden Yards site also presents advantages over the two suburban sites when
examined at a regional scale. According to data supplied in the DOT study, suburban sites
would have put a much larger strain on the surrounding freeways system. In both cases,
96% of all stadium traffic would use the highways. Only 68% of all vehicles, it was
estimated, would arrive at Camden Yards via the freeway system. This difference is
attributable to the grid of primary streets surrounding and leading from the site that would
be used, according to DOT data, by a large proportion of patrons in direct routes to and
from the stadium. Furthermore, stadium events will rarely be scheduled for times other
than week nights and week-ends -on average once a year. The likelihood that stadium
traffic will coincide with local peak flows is low, while on the other hand -as Edward Cline
pointed out- a circulation network designed to handle hundreds of thousands of commuters
daily will be available for stadium patrons.
The issue of background traffic also emerges at a regional level of analysis-
everyday roadway traffic unaffiliated with stadium events that may be potentially disrupted
by the stadium's traffic. As Interstate 95 is one of the most heavily traveled highways in the
nation, minimizing the impact on traffic traveling through Baltimore on the highway is
essential. While all three sites were predicted to have impacts on 1-95 through traffic,
Camden Yards is the most logical stadium site in this regard because it lies within the city's
network of Interstate by-passes (See Figure 2.25). This by-pass would therefore continue
to provide Interstate 95 traffic with an opportunity to avoid stadium traffic, while "no
alternative routes would have been available" for the suburban sites given their location on
the by-pass. 29
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Figure 2.26
Parking Garages in Baltimore's CBD within 7 blocks of Oriole Park
(Rummel, Klepper & Kahl)
Parking
In considering possible sites for a stadium, and concern that goes had-in-hand with access
is that of parking. And as was the case with access, consultants with the Stadium Authority
concluded that locating the stadium at the Camden Yards site would provide the most
attractive parking opportunities.
This conclusion was based on the fact that the city's Central Business District
already possessed sufficient parking -in addition to circulation- within the immediate
vicinity of the site to support a stadium.30 Studies concluded that 32 off street parking
3 0 Peat Marwick et al, Dec. 1, 1986, p. 40
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facilities (labeled A through FF in Figure 2.26) within seven blocks of the site would
provide sufficient parking for any events held at the stadium.3 1 Because, as mentioned
previously, virtually all games can be scheduled for evenings and weekends, conflicts over
parking between CBD workers and stadium patrons would be minimal. Indeed, this idea
was not unprecedented, having been adopted successfully in the siting of other stadia.
Managers of these downtown stadia reported to the Maryland Stadium Authority that the
use of downtown parking by stadium patrons has not been problematic. Furthermore the
use of downtown parking facilities by stadium patrons is advantageous for the city, as it
represents an intensified use of existing land uses 32.
Functionally, the use of the existing, dispersed set of parking facilities was
predicted to alleviate problems of "dump times". Dump times are defined by transportation
planners as the time required for the last fan to leave the parking facility, and are used as a
gauge of driver frustration, environmental degradation, and low fuel efficiency. 33 While
each of the three stadium sites was predicted as encountering one hour dump times from the
site,34 consider that the suburban Landsdowne and Nursery Road sites were designed with
a full allotment 14,000 spaces on site while Camden Yards would have roughly half this
number. Thus, analyses showed that roughly 6,000 to 7,000 fewer cars (22,000 to 25,000
fewer fans*) would be waiting up to one hour to leave the Camden Yards site than the
suburban sites -leaving instead, at an efficient rate from garages dispersed along the
downtown road network 35.
Nevertheless, several studies concurred that, with regards to parking, Camden
Yards represents a viable and efficient location for a major athletic facility.
31 RKK, p. F-3.
3 2 Paul, Evans, Executive Planner, Strategic Planning Division, City of Baltimore,
Conversation, January 21, 1992
3 3 RKK, p. S-1
3 4 RKK, p. S-1
Using standard 3.5 patrons per car, 50,000 patrons at capacity
3 5 Peat Marwick et al., Dec.1, 1986, p. 40
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Alternative Modes of Access
In evaluating the site alternative, it was concluded that the accessibility awarded the
downtown location also negated one of the major strengths of the suburban sites -regional
accessibility. The primary tenant of the new facility, the Baltimore Orioles, have historically
drawn upon regional support ; in 1985 54% of their fans were from outside the City of
Baltimore, including 22% from metropolitan Washington, DC.36 Although the suburban
sites supposedly provided superior access for these fans, Orioles management concluded
that the DC commuter link, as well as the "park & ride" lots at many of the suburban
subway and light rail stations, would better serve their regional interests.
While existing parking and circulation provisions were significant factors in the
Maryland Stadium Authority's decision to locate a stadium downtown, the most attractive
element of the existing urban context was the network of centrally-oriented alternative
modes of access. On the Camden Yards site was the terminus of the Maryland
Transportation Authority (MTA) Washington-Baltimore commuter line as well as a
proposed stop for the city's new light rail system. In addition, within six blocks of the
stadium were two subway stops, and there was potential to re-route several radial bus
routes to access the stadium. (A study undertaken subsequent to the site selection
concluded that five routes could be re-routed to access the stadium directly, while 24 others
would pass within walking distance of the site.37)
The scope of transportation alternatives provided to downtown Baltimore and to the
site were decisive for the obvious reason, according to Ed Cline, that fewer fans would
travel to the site by car, leading to more efficient access and egress for fans. 38 This would
be good for both the city and the stadium's business, as fans would not be forced to drive
3 6 RKK, Fig. c-1
3 7 Magersupp, John, Chief Superintendent, Operations Planning, Maryland Transportation
Authority, conversation, Jan. 23, 1992
3 8 Cline, conversation, Jan. 21, 1992
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and would not be deterred by inaccessibility or lack of mode access-egress alternatives.
Although early analyses showed that Camden Yards could expect no advantage in modal
split over suburban sites (80% of patrons using cars in each case), more recent studies have
predicted that up to 30% of fans can be expected to access Camden Yards by alternative
modes.3 9
Preconceptions
In addition to the technical findings that favored the Camden site, there appears to have
been a long-standing bias towards the site, as issues of Baltimore's downtown
redevelopment and stadium planning have never been totally independent. The relocation of
the Bullets to suburban Washington for example was not simply a move to a more lucrative
venue, but a rescue -in the franchises opinion- from an intolerable environment. "One of
the main reasons they [moved]", according to Cline, "was because their customers didn't
want to come to the Civic Center... A lot of people were afraid to come to downtown
Baltimore."40
The loss of the Bullets was thus a statement about both poor playing facilities and
the decline of the city center. The aforementioned study by the Maryland Sports Complex
authority (that immediately followed the loss of the Bullets) consequently recommended
that the much needed stadium be combined with a convention center facility, and be located
downtown in the Camden Yards area; the concept being that while the loss of sports
franchise may have reflected the conditions downtown, a new complex "[could] be the
centerpiece of redevelopment in the downtown area."41
Studies undertaken following the loss of the Colts also recommended that any new
facility be constructed downtown; Figure 2.27 depicts a multi-purpose stadium proposed
by the Baltimore Stadium Task Force in 1985. A precedent of thought therefore existed
3 9 Magersupp, conversation, 1992
4 0 Cline, conversation, 1992
41 Cline, conversation, 1992
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Figure 2.27
An early conception of a dual-purpose stadium for Camden Yards
(HOK Sports Facilities Group)
prior to the Maryland Stadium Authority's site selection that the stadium should be included
as an element of any downtown redevelopment efforts. Nevertheless, the city has pursued
and fulfilled -as mentioned- a rigorous redevelopment initiative independent of the state's
reluctance to build a stadium. While a stadium was not an element of these projects, many
believe that they now provide an excellent setting for a stadium.
Impacts of the Stadium
Although the stadium has been operating for less than a month, concerns have already been
raised regarding the various types of impacsts Oriole Park will have on the residents of
Baltimore.
Perhaps the most contentious issue in planning a stadium is its affect on the general
quality of life for nearby residents. Planning and designing a stadium for an urban context
is thus particularly challenging in this regard.
As has been noted, Oriole Park's designers have gone to great lengths to respond
sensitively to the given context by relating the site both aesthetically and functionally to its
47
urban surroundings. Yet the ballpark also respects the proximity of the historic Otterbein
and Ridgely's Delight neighborhoods with the inclusion of measures designed specifically
to disassociate them from the park. The warehouse for instance, will act for Otterbein
residents as a barrier to noise and light emanating from the stadium. Ridgely's Delight
residents will benefit from an extensive redesign of Russell Street. In addition to the
street's expansion to six lanes, landscape buffers on both sides of the road, a boulevard,
and an on-site bus lane provide a formidable obstacle for stadium patrons. Evans Paull,
planner for the City of Baltimore has pointed out that "in case they haven't gotten the
message, we're also putting a short fence up" along the western edge of the street. 42
Although, as mentioned, the selection of the downtown site was based largely on
accessibility and parking advantages, there is potential for certain adverse impacts.
Analyses, for example, have warned that failing to provide parking for stadium patrons in
one specific location will inadvertently lead to driver confusion regarding destination.43
Patrons will be uncertain as to which facilities will be full upon arrival; cross-site traffic
will ultimately ensue as thousands of motorists criss-cross downtown searching for
available parking.
A more specific problem for the Camden Yards site will be the decision to develop
the 5,000 space on-site parking lot -in particular, to build a new football stadium in the near
future (Figure 2.28). Preliminary plans suggest that multi-level structures can be built on-
site in the remaining space, but they will undoubtedly house far less than 5,000 spaces and
it is unclear how many more cars the existing parking in Baltimore's Central Business
District is capable of absorbing.
4 2 Paul, Evans, conversation, January 20, 1992
4 3 RKK, p. S-2
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Figure 2.28
Future Camden Yards sports facilities tandem
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
It is too early to determine what will be the ultimate economic impacts of the stadium, yet
Baltimore city planner Evans Paull envisions two categories of "spin-off benefits" that will
be captured by the city. The first type concern the added market for evening and weekend-
oriented businesses, such as bars and restaurants. According to his estimates, and
assuming that fan spending will be met entirely by new establishments, the new space
required to serve stadium patrons would be roughly 52,000 square feet. 4 While the
stadium may enhance the market for retail businesses in the area, Paull does not feel the
impact is sufficient enough to warrant any alteration in the City's neighborhood
redevelopment plans. In particular, the majority of land in the Market West urban renewal
area is currently zoned medium and high density commercial development. "The densities
4 4 Paull, Evans: Memo: Stadium-Related Development. City of Baltimore Department of
Planning, Sept. 26, 1988, p. 1
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allowed [in the Market West neighborhood] are certainly more than what's necessary to
accommodate any stadium-related development that we foresee. And they are zoned for
anything you would want to put there."45 The city therefore taken a laissez-faire position:
they see no need to rethink the planning of Camden Yard's context in any comprehensive
manner.
Rather, the City believes that the stadium will help in the achievement of the plan's
objectives. Susan Eliasberg of the Baltimore Redevelopment Corporation feels that the
stadium provides the market needed to "fill in" underdeveloped areas of the
neighborhood. 46 Paull concurs, arguing that the area will attract investment as it now "lies
along the beaten path" between the stadium and points north of the site, including a subway
station.47
The second category of spin-offs from which Paull anticipates benefits are those
associated with the ball park's contribution to a critical mass of visitor-oriented activity.
While the city has rapidly transformed into a prominent tourist destination, it has not been
able to reap the full benefits of the tourist industry as the majority of tourists coming to
Baltimore do not stay overnight. The city has thus adopted a policy of attempting to add to
the critical mass of activity around the Inner-Harbor in an effort to convince visitors to stay
overnight. Officials believe that the stadium will prove a substantial addition to this critical
mass. Specifically, if the stadium led to a 2% increase in the number of tourists that
currently stay overnight, Paull estimates that the effect would be an increase in hotel
demand of almost 200 rooms.48
In addtion to observed economic activity abd Paull's projectons, The Maryland
Stadium Authority has forecasted the broad ranging and long-term economic benefits of
their two-stadium sports complex. In addition to a "one-time" impact of nearly $259 million
4 5 Paul, Evans, conversation, January 20, 1992
4 6 Dresser, Michael: "Businesses Catch Baseball Fever", The Baltimorte Sun, Jan. 18, 1992, p.
1F
4 7 Paul, Evans, conversation, January 24, 1992
4 8 Paull, Evans, p. 3
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(representing activity associated with site preparation and facility design and constuction),
the Stadium Authority study projects an annual impact of $78.6 million. Discounted over a
15 year period, the present value of the projects impacts is estimated at $1.1 billion.49
While the City and Stadium Authority are anticipating positive economic gains from
the stadium, Paull suggests that they are also disappointed about its impact on the area's
industry. The City values the industry in the area given that it is the city's most intensive
industrial area and is easily accessible to the city's working class. Officials were therefore
despondent over the Maryland Stadium Authority's decision to locate a 5,000 car surface
parking lot on site; supporting instead a proposal that would have provided no parking
south of Martin Luther King Boulevard and would have thus minimized the displacement
of industry.
As it is, Paull estimates that the stadium project displaced 1155 industry-related
jobs.50 Although the Maryland Stadium Authority provided a relocation allowance, and
most businesses were relocated within the city limits, Paull notes that relocation has
nevertheless come at great expense to the city; in the form of favorable land write-downs
and financing arrangements, and poor accessibility for employees.
A second, less direct impact on the area's remaining industry has been land
speculation that has followed the ballpark's construction. Such patterns hinder the quality
and viability of businesses because, as Paull points out "[they] start thinking 'hey, maybe I
better not start investing in my property because in a couple of years, I might be able to sell
it for a zillion dollars."' Furthermore the trend leads owners to refrain from negotiating
long term leases. 51
How People Think about the Stadium and its Relation to Context
4 9Peat Marwick, Mitchell, and Co.: Report on the Economic and Tax Impacts of the Camden
Yards Stadium Development, March 24, 1987, p. 8
5 0 Paul, Evans, conversation, January 20, 1992
5 1 Paul, Evans, conversation, January 24, 1992
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In evaluating the Camden Yards project, baseball and design enthusiasts seem to have
reached a consensus that the baseball facility is nothing short of a Godsend. "Seldom does
a building draw the kind of near unanimous raves that the city's new baseball park did after
its design was unveiled."
Design critics are in awe of the ballparks urban character, particularly in comparison
to its immediate predecessors; suggesting that "Oriole Park at Camden Yards demonstrates
the often underestimated value of sensible land use planning combined with sensitive urban
design and architecture." 52 Oriole Park at Camden Yards, according to design critic Paul
Goldberger, "is capable of wiping out in a single gesture fifty years of wretched stadium
design"53 and thus has the potential to mark the birth of a new era in stadium planning.
Baseball aficionados and professionals hold Oriole Park in equally high regard. For
them, the park's small scale park, quirky interior dimensions, and (relatively) intimate
interior are a refreshing attempt to re-create the confines in which professional baseball was
originally played. Upon seeing the ballpark's design, former baseball Commissioner A.
Bartlett Giamatti warned Orioles' management that "once you build this, every [other] team
will want one just like it."54
It is in part the timing of the Oriole Park project that makes it exciting for baseball
enthusiasts. With Chicago's old Comiskey Park demolished after eighty years of service,
Yankee Stadium in the Bronx having been modernized "into something less than the house
that Ruth built"55, and discussions ongoing over the possible replacement of the remaining
GoldenAge ballparks, Oriole Park gives hope that their legacy will not be totally forgotten.
Interestingly, those involved in the project view it in more modest terms. In
pushing for a ballpark with traditional character, Eli Jacobs and Janet-Marie Smith did not
set forth to "save baseball"; nor did they commit to the design concept as a marketing ploy
5 2 Forgey, Benjamin:"Baltimore's Home Run", Washington Post, March 29, 1992, p. C1
5 3 Goldberger, Sept. 19, 1989, p. H3
5 4 Pastier, John: "Architect's Play Ball", Metropolitan Home, October, 1989, p. 82
5 5 Pastier,October, 1989 , p. 82
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in anticipation of such favorable reactions. Rather, Smith insists, Oriole Park as built is
merely a reflection of its surroundings; and, as such, represents the only conceivable
design approach. "Having been given the spot, the architects and urban designers knew
what to do with it." 56
Furthermore, the notion that Oriole Park is simply a logical solution is reflected in
the opinions about the site's selection. Camden yards is considered a "dream location" by
critics, 57 but given the City's successful downtown redevelopment record, the decision to
locate the project in the city's center, according to Smith, "is simply another example of
Baltimore's moving a step ahead of what other cities are doing in their urban
renaissance." 58
Oriole Park is clearly a radical departure from the design concepts replicated throughout the
1970's and 80's, and for this departure it is held in high regard. But lost in all of the praise
of its aesthetic charm is an understanding of the planning efforts involved in making this
project feasible. Few seem to mention, for example,that many of the features that have
already made this one of the most popular sports facilities in North America (inlcuding its
location and design) were not adopted by simply by choice. Rather they result from an
effort to plan Baltimore's stadium in a responsible manner. It is therefore important that, in
planning stadia, designers and planners look beyond its salient features to understand the
planning problems and decisions that lay behind them.
5 6 Forgey, March 29, 1992, p. C5
5 7 Forgey, March 29, 1992, p. C5
5 8 Masello, David: "Playing the Field", Architectural Record. Oct. 1990, p. 45
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CHAPTER 3: The Toronto SkyDome
SkyDome, first opened to the public in 1989, is the product of a six year planning effort
that followed dozens of unsuccessful attempts to provide the City of Toronto with its own
'world-class' stadium. Yet while this successful initiative began with typical visions of
stadia common to municipalities across North America, issues of public and private
financing, location, structure type, and city image would lead to the construction of a urban
sports facility that is in a class of its own. Indeed SkyDome, with its wondrous retractable
roof, movable seating system, extensive program of activities, and general aura of ultra-
modernity speaks to the limits of imagination within which stadium planners and designers
have been working for the past several decades. The purpose of this chapter is to present
the Toronto SkyDome project from a planning perspective; to examine the forces behind its
design and locations, and to assess the issues involved in planning "The World's Greatest
Entertainment Center" for an urban context.
SkyDome Site and Context
Perhaps the most stunning aspect of SkyDome, aside from its unprecedented roof, is its
location. Defying the conception of sports facilities as strictly suburban land uses,
SkyDome is situated in the heart of the city, on the western fringe of the well defined core
of downtown Toronto (Figure 3.1). Its downtown location puts it within blocks of many
of the city's other attractions, including the Roy Thomson Concert Hall and the Royal
Alexandra Theatre to the north, and the city's heralded Harbourfront pavilion only three
blocks to the south (Figure 3.2). In addition, it lies adjacent to the Metro Toronto
Convention Center, and to the CN Tower -with the stadium and tower comprising one of
the most awesome land mark tandems in the world.
SkyDome's immediate context, however, is the Railway Lands -a conspicuously
underdeveloped area relative to its dense surroundings. Once the heart of Toronto's
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industry and the backbone of the city's economic growth, the Lands were in fact reclaimed
throughout the 19th century, as the city's burgeoning rail and shipping activities exploded
the city's natural physical boundaries. However, as Toronto's economy followed those of
other cities in shifting away from heavy industry to tertiary, office-based activities over the
past decades, the Railway Lands had gradually fallen into a state of underutilization.
The Initial Plans for the Railway Lands
The notion that the lands possessed untapped potential first surfaced in the early
1960's, with plans initiated from both the private and public sector. The plan which most
influenced contemporary thoughts and objectives was the Metro Centre Development Plan
and Program, released in 1968 by the two major landholders in the area: Canadian National
and Canadian Pacific railways. The Metro Centre proposal represented a modernistic
perspective of the railway Lands' future: millions of square feet of office, commercial and
residential space -the vast majority in tower complexes- to be erected form one edge of the
site to the other. Figure 3.3 represents a view of the Metro Centre conception from the east.
Six years were subsequently spent attempting to have the plan approved, with no
success. Questions arose on the behalf of the landowners concerning its financial feasibility
as the market had yet to catch up with the costs of reusing the lands, while the idea of -
demolishing the historic Union Station grew unpopular. (The CN Tower stands as the sole
symbol of the plan's grand vision). The Metro Center Plan was, however, influential in that
it furthered planners later ideas about what was not appropriate function of the Railway
Lands. Planning policy for the site that followed the shelving to the Metro Centre plan and
preceded construction of SkyDome revolved around the fundamental premise that the site
not be developed in its entirety as a distinct megastructure. Rather, that the site be blended
sensitively into the fabric of the city, an initiative that would include replicating to the extent
possible the familiar characteristics of the city, and relating land uses appropriately to the
areas bordering the site. The concept of simply extending the functions of adjacent areas
onto the Railway Lands was sensible in that it ensured on-site development that would relate
appropriately to adjacent land uses. Furthermore, the definition of the railway Lands as an
entity would be weakened as the various districts in the site would relate in function to their
adjacent areas to the north rather than to each other.
While the approach of pulling the urban fabric over the Railway Lands has intuitive
appeal, it would also allow for the site to be developed incrementally -an approach that was
Figure 3.3
View of Metro Centre proposal from the east
(City of Toronto Planning and Development Department)
more consistently applied by the City's Planning Department.1 Furthermore, it worked
towards the overlaying objectives -carried over form the Metro Centre plan- that the Railway
Lands serve to improve access to the adjacent CBD to the east and waterfront to the south.
Figure 3.4 is a view of the 1983 plan for the Railway Lands.
1McLaughlin, Stephen, Former Commisioner, City of Toronto Planning and Development Department,
conversation, Jan. 27, 1992
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Figure 3.4
Pre-Stadium plan for the Railway Lands
(City of Toronto Planning and Development Department)
Elements of the SkyDome Project
SkyDome's designers have provided an interesting paradox. On the one hand, they
have introduced the most effective solution yet to the dome/no dome and single
purpose/dual-purpose design dilemmas by introducing unprecedented technology -and
thus creating a landmark structure. But through design and programming, they have
presented a concept that is decidedly more urban-friendly than any of the preceding Post-
War and Modem-Age conceptions. It therefore defeats its predecessors at both fronts:
serving its initial purpose more effectively while respecting the nature of its surrounds.
SkyDome is striking in that it extends well beyond conventional definitions of a
stadium. While Camden Yards' planners have touted the future of sports stadia to be a
return to early century concepts, SkyDome's planners and designers have attempted to
rectify the shortcomings of modem, multi-purpose stadia by elaborating on the concept.
Rather than designing a facility primarily around the needs of baseball and football tenants,
SkyDome has an unprecedented versatility that enables it to particular space needs of
almost any event imaginable.
The most obvious element of this versatility is SkyDome's retractable roof; the
design of which took chief architect Rod Robbie and engineering consultant Michael Allen
nearly a year to conceive. The two began with the premise that their concept should not
only be safe, but that itfeel safe; the designers understood the horror that could engulf the
thousands of people over whom the roof would operate upon experiencing the movement
of a building. Their design solution is a roof comprised of four sections of arched steel
trusses -hemispheric end sections and arched telescopic sections covering the mid section
(Figure 3.5). When retracted, the two center sections telescope straight forward while one
end section rotates fully around, leaving 91% of the seating fully exposed. The entire
process takes only 20 minutes, but is considered to be "like no other experience in
architecture." 2
2 Goldberger, Paul: "Double Header in Toronto: Batter Up, Top Down. New York Times, July 16, 1989, p. H 29
Figure 3.5
SkyDome's retractable roof
(RAN Consortium)
Thus, with its roof alone SkyDome is an era removed from other stadia. It leaves
both fixed roof and open-anti stadia "obsolete" according to Robbie, as it guarantees
optimal conditions for any event. 3 Indeed, the stadium has led to a new school of thought
about how stadia might be covered (Figure 3.6) The roof does not, however, represent the
full extent of SkyDome's changeable character. The stadium designers also improved
upon modem stadium conventions by designing a flexible seating configuration. The
3 Robbie, Roderick, conversation, Jan. 29, 1992
Figure 3.6
Other retractable roof concepts
(Mike Filey)
lower banks of seating are mounted on tracks, and can rotate around the interior of the
stadium in order to optimize sight lines for baseball, football, and a range of other possible
events (Figures 3.7). Thus, with these two examples of technical wizardry SkyDome
separates itself from other stadia and domes -to be, according to its marketers, "The
World's Greatest Entertainment Centre."4
SkyDome is further distinguished by the activity that takes place outside of the
playing surface, as it possesses a diverse program that defies traditional conceptions of
stadia. There are seven eating establishments in SkyDome, including a five star restaurant
and two bars -all overlooking the playing surface- as well as North America's largest
McDonald's. SkyDome also houses 14 conference rooms, a 7,000 SF fitness center, and
its own $15 million television and radio production center. The most outstanding element
of these, however, is the 348-room hotel (with seventy rooms overlooking SkyDome's
4 Stadium Corporation of Ontario: SkyDome: "World's Greatest Entertainment Centre", December, 1991, p. 1
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Figure 3.7
Some of SkyDome's possible seating arrangements
(Stadium Corporation of Ontario)
interior) draped around the stadiums northern elevation -occupying space underneath the
retracted roof panels. It too represents a feat of engineering, as the entire structure is hung
from the stadium (Figure 3.8).
SkyDome's range of activities are perhaps the definitive element of its image. "We
don't want to be known as a jock palace" says Richard Peddie. Indeed, SkyDome's
additional provisions are all open to the general public outside of event times. The building
is thus less a flying saucer of sports, totally useless and abandoned save a few hours a
week, and in fact functions as a decidedly multi-use structure.
The charge was on Roderick Robbie to devise an architectural solution that would
compliment SkyDome's program and technological wizardry. Robbie's basic premise was
to design for tomorrow, given the facility's futuristic disposition and 100 year design life
(which, Robbie insists, translates into a 300 year life span). Robbie envisions extensive
and continued growth in the urban fabric surrounding the stadium site over the next
century, and consequently "designed the stadium as if it were in the middle of
Manhattan."5 The challenge was therefore to arrive at a design that would present the
stadium as a special place in an environment of structures competing for attention, but
would not simultaneously render the stadium unapproachable in a pedestrian environment.
Robbie thus shunned what he considers "the architectural style of the day"6
sweeping stadium design, but also ignored the self-serving style of past stadia. Rather,
SkyDome displays straight-sided east and west elevations, treated with horizontal strips of
glazed curtain wall; integrated to minimize its scale and in replication of the buildings
envisioned as one-day defining SkyDome's context. (Figure 3.9). Indeed, SkyDome's
facades are criticized as being "appropriate to an office building",7when in fact this was
the effect sought by Robbie as, paradoxically perhaps, it will allow his monumental
5 Robbie, Roderick, Chief Architect, the RAN Consortium, conversation, Jan. 29, 1992
6 Robbie, Roderick, conversation, Jan. 29, 1992
7 Diamond, A.J. "Domed Stadium, Toronto" Canadian Architect, May, 1989, p. 34.
Figure 3.8
SkyDome Hotel, located on the north side of the stadium
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
Figure 3.9
Fenestration along SkyDome's eastern elevation
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
facility to be as responsive to its environs as are the brown-bag ball parks of the Golden
Age. 8
Forces Behind SkyDome's Planning and Construction
The Political and Financial Backing
Although several stadium initiatives preceded the construction of SkyDome -as will be
discussed, the political force behind this initiative emanated from the Provincial
government. Toronto's 1976 acquisition of a Major League Baseball franchise generated a
groundswell of public interest in the construction of a dome stadium "forcing political
officials to formally consider the issue." 9
Yet, those close to the project insist that even more influential than public pressure
was one very propitious ordeal for Premier William Davis. No one became more convinced
of the city's need for a dome when, in November 1982 he was forced to sit through
horrific conditions while watching the Grey Cup, Canada's professional football
championship, turn into an ice and rain folly. Davis' ordeal, as much as any other event,
would lead to the construction of a new dome in Toronto.
Only seven months thereafter, Davis, formally announced to the public his decision
to investigate the possibility of a new stadium for Toronto. While the Macaulay
Committee's recommendation concerning stadium location was never acted upon, their
recommendations regarding the other two key issues of facility type and location would
ultimately serve to frame the stadium initiative. First, citing both a great "pleasure in
watching baseball or football outdoors on a beautiful summer evening" and the versatility
allowed by domes, the Macaulay Committee recommended "strongly that specifications for
a new stadium include a retractable roof"; 10 and in doing so formalized a concept that had
8 Goldberger, July 16, 1989, p. H 29
9 Filey, Mike, Like No Other in the World, The Story of Toronto's SkyDome Sun Controlled Ventures Inc.,
Toronto, 1989, p. 48
1 0Macaulay, Hugh G.; Bremner, W.; Schipper, L.H.; McNeil, R.: The Stadium Committee Report, Province of
Ontario, Feb., 1984,p. 65
previously been limited to rumor and speculation. In addition, the Committee recommended
that financing include "significant participation by the private sector", 11 thereby
establishing as a guideline the widely-held conviction that the public sector contribute
extensively to the project.
Subsequent to the submission of the Macaulay Committee's report, the Premiere
was tendered a financial offer by Canadian businessman Trevor Eyton. Eyton reported that
he had organized a consortium of thirteen corporations that were willing to contribute over
$60 million towards a dome stadium project. The $5 million put forth by each of the
consortium members was not to be a donation, but rather an investment -a conversion of
future benefits into initial capital investment. 12 Initial investments were to be traded for box
seats, exclusive advertising rights, and preferred supplier status. 13 The fact that many of
the consortium members were "brand name" corporations, including Coca-Cola, Merrill
Lynch, and Labatt's Breweries, meant that these deals represented potentially high and
long-term returns on investment. As a preferred supplier, consortium member McDonald's
Canada, for example, was awarded exclusive concession rights. This original consortium
has since evolved into the 30-member Stadium Corporation of Ontario.
SkyDome's Designers
The task of designing this unprecedented facility was awarded to the architect and
engineering duo of Roderick Robbie and Michael Allen. For them the project evolved into
an extremely exhaustive and risky proposition.
Upon arriving at their solution to the retractable roof design challenge, the pair
engaged in a fierce series of competitions leading up to the final selection. Robbie insists it
took as much energy to protect the design as it did to conceive it. "[The competing firms]
did everything short putting contracts out on each other."14 In order to survive the rigors of
11Macaulay, p2
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the later rounds -in which working drawings would be required, they would ultimately
request the expertise and human power of the NORR Partnership, a large architecture firm
eliminated in an early round. Together the three formed the RAN Consortium that would
win the Toronto dome contract.
Robbie's and Allen's tribulations would however only begin with the victory. The
Stadium Corporation imposed the condition that the team lower the cost by $40 million,
thus forcing a redesign that would occupy a staff of 60 for ten months. However, the team
received no fees until the drawings were completed.15 With his firm on the verge of
bankruptcy, Robbie went so far as to mortgage his house.
Pressure on Robbie and his design team would persist virtually up to the opening
ceremonies, as the project remained "in a constant state of evolution."16 The design/build
process adopted for the project would be strained as program elements were continuously
added. The hotel for example -proposed three months after groundbreaking- had to be
designed seven times17 and forced a virtual redesign of the stadium by Robbie's team.18
A member of the public-sector who would also have substantial impact on the SkyDome
project was Stephen McLaughlin. As Commissioner of the City's Planning and
Development Department throughout the planning of both SkyDome and Railway Lands
area, McLaughlin led two major initiatives regarding the stadium's planning and design that
would help the facility assimilate into the Railway Lands as proposed, making him an
integral role-player in the project.
Although intrigued at the proposition of a downtown stadium, McLaughlin was
insistent throughout that it perform as an urban stadium -something he believed had yet to
be achieved elsewhere. For McLaughlin, this meant providing a multitude of activities,
15 Huntley, Chris: "Sports Coverage", Building, June 2, 1989, v. 254, #22, p.2 1
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permitting the stadium -like any urban building, in his opinion- to engage life beyond its
primary purpose. "I kept saying we want an urban dome, not a suburban dome... a mix of
uses to get a 24 hour life. Even office buildings should, in theory, have a mix of uses." 19
Why, then, not so for a stadium? Although McLaughlin was initially ignored by the
Province, he was the first to propose the multitude of activities that currently serve to define
SkyDome.
McLaughlin's second initiative was to ensure that the stadium also present itself as
an urban structure architecturally. To this end, he defined a set of guidelines that were, in
part, a criticism of Robbie's winning entry. In addition to being too tall, McLaughlin
believed the stadium to be "too fat"20 such that it would not relate well with the street grid
to the north and with the street pattern planned for the Railway Lands. A compromise was
reached whereby the approaching streets would be slightly realigned in order to terminate
views of John and Peter Streets approaching from the north and to provide a gateway
affect. 21
In addition, it was McLaughlin who would convince Robbie to articulate the east
and western elevations in a manner consistent with "normal urban buildings",22 and to
encourage public's interest in the building's edges by providing such pedestrian-scale
amenities as glazed canopies along the facade and landscaped mezzanines. 23 Clearly,
McLaughlin approached the design of SkyDome with and understanding of what would be
the stadium's future context.
Motivation: Why SkyDome was Built
A Legacy of Stadium Plans
19 McLaughlin, Stephen, conversation, January 20, 1992
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As was the case in Baltimore, the question as to whether Toronto needed a new
stadium did not begin with the SkyDome project. Indeed, the dome is the realization of
long-standing efforts to build a stadium in Toronto.
Efforts to build a stadium in Toronto date as far back as 1923,24 and virtually all
initiatives have revolved around the argument that 'major-league caliber city' and should
therefore have a major league facility. Indeed, for decades Toronto was bound by the
Catch-22 of needing to build a stadium in order to lure professional baseball. A major
effort to surmount this dilemma was undertaken 1954, when the City of Toronto put forth a
request to the Metro Toronto Planning Board to compile a report outlining suitable sites for
a multi-use stadium. The preamble to the request indicates that, like Baltimore and many
other cities, the city was concerned about the relationship between urban image and
professional sports.
Metropolitan Toronto's status as the business headquarters
for Eastern Canada and its growing stature as a metropolitan
centre have made it a logical location for conventions and
trade shows... It would also appear that a real demand
exists for stadium facilities which might accommodate major
league baseball, professional football and possibly the
British Empire Games.. 25
Although this initiative was never acted upon, it exemplifies a great deal of the motivation
behind the Toronto stadium initiative.
The idea that Toronto ought not only to build a stadium, but one that represented the
state of the art, preceded SkyDome by nearly thirty years. The 1965 unveiling of the
Houston Astrodome, the world's first fully enclosed stadium, would alter the nature of the
stadium debate, as a domed facility would become the centerpiece of almost every
subsequent initiative in Toronto. Stadium proponents argued that not only was Toronto's
harsh climate deserving of an all-weather facility, but "everyone believed that a major
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league baseball franchise would surely follow the decision to build a dome"26 and that it
would without question certify Toronto's status as a major league city.
Nevertheless, Toronto would continue to go without a successful stadium initiative
long after the Astrodome's opening. And with the opening of a number of domed stadia
across North America in such cities as Detroit, Minneapolis, and Indianapolis, as well as
Canada's first in Vancouver, the novelty of domes -and thus much of the impetus to build
one in Toronto- waned. However, business and government officials continued to push for
a stadium, but in their image of Toronto as an emerging world center, believed their city
was worthy of more. Thus, by the time the Macaulay Commission was convened in 1984,
their was a strong movement to investigate to potential of building the world's first
retractable roof stadium in Toronto,
A second approach initiated in the 1960's -also related to the city's image- was to
promote a new stadium as a magnet for the Summer Olympic Games. In an effort to lure
the 1968 Summer Games to Toronto, G. Ross Anderson, a Toronto native and professor
of architecture at the University of Kansas, conceived a 100,000 seat stadium -based on the
facility built in Melbourne for the 1956 Summer Games- that could be devoted to baseball
and football following the Olympics. 27 Although strongly supported by the City, this
particular initiative would die when the 1968 Games were awarded to Mexico City28.
And in 1969, Metro Chairman William Allen combined the dome and Olympics
approach by suggesting that construction of the former would bring the latter and would
also lure a baseball franchise.29 Ultimately, Toronto would not only lose out on the
Olympics but would watch them be awarded to rival city Montreal.
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Efforts to combine the Olympics and stadium initiatives would also affect the
decision to build SkyDome. As the stadium was completed, Toronto engaged in its most
vigorous campaign to lure the 1996 Summer Olympics to Toronto.
The Financial Impetus
One of the main reasons that a dome initiative would finally succeed was due to the
nullification of the strongest anti-stadium arguments. The concept of a publicly funded
stadium, while gaining wide acceptance in the United States, remained wholly unpopular in
Ontario.
While many American politicians have supported stadium projects for fear of the
consequences of opposing them, Canadian politicians had for years been vociferous about
spending public monies in what they considered to be an irresponsible and inequitable
manner. Even the extreme start-up costs of a dome project was an insufficient argument for
public funding. Previous initiatives had been met with assurances that "there was no way
that the [provincial] government would lay out [major funding] to help provide a stadium or
any other facilities that private enterprises could use."30 Efforts were further undermined as
Torontonians watched Montreal's inoperative convertible stadium balloon in a construction
and repair costs to over $1.2 billion dollars
Trevor Eyton thus weakened this position and made strong progress towards a
dome's construction when he announced to Premiere William Davis that he had organized a
consortium of corporations interested in funding a substantial portion of a stadium's cost.
The decision by consortium members to invest in the stadium project was based largely on
the type of structure proposed. The fact that a retractable roof was recommended to Davis
by the Macaulay Committee gave prospective investors the vision of investing not in a well-
precedent, unremarkable fixed-roof facility, but rather in a unique "world class" facility.31
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While many members trumpet patriotic motives for wanting a retractable roof32,
influencing the decisions on stadium type was viewed as a means of ensuring returns on
investment. Such an unprecedented and awesome facility would most likely attract millions
of patrons and more importantly, would attract a plethora of tenants beyond the local
football and baseball teams. A retractable roof would guarantee optimal conditions for
functions of virtually any scale and scope; this, in addition to its novelty, made for an
attractive investment opportunity.
Factors Behind the Decision to Locate Downtown
Financing
Thus, while the Maryland Stadium Authority was mandated to fund a stadium type and
location it saw fit -(with these two issues themselves being considered independently),
such would not be the case in Toronto. Because a substantial portion of funding would
emanate from the private sector (if the committee's recommendations were to be followed)
it is not surprising that conditions be imposed by the private sector on the key issue of
facility type.
But so too would the private investors influence the decision on the key issue of
location. During unfruitful negotiations with the Federal Government for the rights to land
on the periphery of a suburban Canadian Forces air base -indeed, the site recommended by
the Macaulay Committee, Premier Davis was approached by Canadian National Railway
with an offer of a site on its downtown railway land holdings, next to its famous CN
Tower. The offer coincided with that of Eyton, who's consortium -in addition to attempting
to prescribe a stadium type- hedged their participation on selection of a downtown location.
With this offer on the table, Davis' support of the committee's site recommendation
waned:
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It became clear that the financial arrangements and the choice of stadium site
are highly interrelated. In the end, therefore, site selection has strongly been
influenced by the financial considerations that are possible.
As Davis went on to point out, this reality stemmed from his political (and Canadians'
social) conviction that public sponsorship be kept at an absolute minimum -a position
reinforced -as mentioned- by the Macaulay Committee. But clearly the trade-off was a
relinquishment of public authority over the major decisions of stadium type and site, as the
project could not go forward without the consortium's financial participation.
Land Use Context as a Factor in the Location Decision
The consortium's position was that a convertible stadium was not simply an athletic
facility, but a monument that would serve to mark Ontario's place in the world.
Consequently, location of such a landmark facility, in their opinion, took on particular
meaning. In their opinion "the potential for a [retractable roof] Dome to be the premiere
sports, mass entertainment, convention and meeting forum in North America will greatly be
enhanced if it is located on the CN site"33 -a view that in fact reflects a continued
commitment to strengthening and enriching the city's downtown. For within two blocks of
the CN site were already many of the city's most popular attractions and gathering spaces
(both categories befitting the proposed stadium), including the Royal Alexandra Theatre,
Roy Thomson Concert Hall, the city's Harbourfront commercial and cultural center, and
immediately adjacent to the site, the CN Tower and the Metro Toronto Convention Centre
(see Figure 3.1). In CN's opinion, "the marketing of the stadium [i.e. its profit potential as
a multi-faceted activity center] will surely benefit from... its proximity to [these] already
highly marketed attractions." 34
Another of the site's perceived advantages was the lack of adjacent residential areas.
Indeed, a key criterion used in the Macaulay Committee's site evaluation was any stadium
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be located "so that would not impact unreasonably on its immediate neighbors and
neighborhoods." 35 Railway Lands proponents argued that, unlike the majority of sites
previously considered by the Committee, "the [CN] site is not immediately adjacent to, and
therefore cannot impact materially upon close neighbors." 36
Parking & Access
SkyDome was also promoted by CN as the most accessible location of any potential site,
both in terms of vehicular and public-transportation access. Within three blocks of the
proposed site was Union Station; hub for Canada's national passenger rail service,
terminus for the regional commuter system, and a stop along the city's subway system.
Additionally, plans were in the works for a Spadina Avenue LRT that would pass the site
to the west, and a Railway Lands LRT that would pass by the site, connecting it to Union
Station and to the waterfront.
Vehicular access was also considered superior. The site is served by the Gardiner
Expressway, and by Lakeshore Boulevard, which -when coupled with the network of
seven arterials- "handles downtown Toronto's traffic loads in an acceptable fashion" and
was thus considered capable of handling SkyDome's traffic loads.37
Decisions on how to plan parking for the stadia were a direct function of the
excellent mass-transit access to the site: to provide on-site parking, according to officials,
would only provide incentive for patrons not to use mass-transit. As former Planning
Commissioner McLaughlin added, to submerge the facility in a sea of parking would
hinder future development of the Railway Lands. The number of on site spaces was
therefore limited to 500.
This position was, however, predicated on availability of parking in Toronto's
downtown core and at Harbourfront. An analysis of existing parking facilities, conducted
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as part of the CN site offering, showed that up to 8760 spaces would be available to
stadium patrons, while demand (based on projected modal splits) would not surpass 6,300
during weekends or weekday evenings. The analysts, however, could not guarantee
sufficient parking for weekday events which, in any case, would be extremely
infrequent.38
Impacts of the Stadium
The Economic Impacts
Following through on the objectives of planners, SkyDome has gone beyond the
classification of sports facility; its diverse program and range of events have helped define
SkyDome as a quintessential element of Toronto.
This is due in part to the intensity with which the facility has been used. In 1991,
SkyDome was occupied for 282 days, nearly 80% of the year,39 and in previous years
35% of events in SkyDome have not been related to sports.40 Events housed in SkyDome
ranged in 1991 from the Moscow Circus to a sold out performance of a Broadway musical,
in total attracted 5.4 million visitors,41 -testament to its planners' objectives of creating
more than a mere "jock palace".
SkyDome has further breached the conventional bounds of multi-purpose athletic
facilities by becoming an attraction in itself. Research by SkyDome officials has revealed a
"Dome factor" of 35%, meaning that over one third of patrons would not have attended
events were they not held in SkyDome. The phenomenon also affects tenancy. "Without
SkyDome, there are events which would never have been showcased in Toronto"
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according to David Garrick, SkyDome's Vice President of Corporate Affairs. 42 He
includes in this list the professional baseball All-Star Game, awarded to Toronto two years
after the stadium's opening, and many major concerts and operas. 43 Indeed, SkyDome has
established itself as a special place -as arguably Toronto's premiere landmark.
Impacts of image have been accompanied economic impacts considered by some
analysts to be "immense."44 Some of the most discernible impacts have been tax revenues
as -unlike a number of North American sports facilities- SkyDome is not exempt from
taxes. Officials estimate that the facility will generate over $38 million in annual Municipal,
Provincial, and Federal Taxes. In addition, SkyDome has subsidized Metropolitan
Toronto's infrastructure through in-kind provisions of $45 million worth of improvements;
including $17 million in new roadways, and the $24 million replacement of the Railway
Lands sixty year old pumping station.45
In addition to direct economic impacts, SkyDome is argued to be generating
tremendous spin-off benefits. The stadium "has spawned an entire district of bars and
restaurants" 46, business in area restaurants increases 40% at times of SkyDome events, and
hotel occupancy increases 25% on evenings when the Blue Jays are playing at home 47; the
latter figure testament to the teams historically significant regional following. In total,
analysts have estimated that SkyDome generated $450 million in regional economic
activity, and 16,800 person-years in employment during its first full year of operation.48
SkyDome's positive economic benefits have, however, been partly offset by its
cost to the province. So much so that within three years SkyDome has thus gone from a "a
model of civic endeavor"49 based on its joint public-private backing to "a cautionary tale
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about how not to build a civic monument." 50 This joint partnership had initially planned to
spend $233 million on SkyDome, with the city and province each contributing $30 million
to add to the $5 million put up by each of the corporations (the list of which would grow to
thirty from those originally recruited by Eyton). With a projected debt of only $23 million,
the province agreed to guarantee all borrowings required for construction. 51
The province's financial responsibility would, however, go well beyond initial
estimates.
Late program additions, construction overruns, and worker strikes ultimately pushed
SkyDome's final cost to nearly $600 million, leaving taxpayers with a debt of $330
million. The problems grow worse as interest costs create annual losses and add to the
debt, despite the facility's meeting of annual operating revenue goals. The new provincial
government has sought escape from the endeavor, offering the province's share of
ownership, now at 51%, to any parties willing to assume the debt. However, the
government has no leverage over corporations who are partially responsible for the cost
overruns, and none are interested in increased equity in SkyDome.52 Although it was not
intended to be the case, it appears Ontarians will be following the path taken by taxpayers
across North America: "Anyone who thinks that the taxpayers won't be stuck with much of
[SkyDome's] debt is living in a dream world."53
Transportation and Parking Impacts
In assessing SkyDome's impact on the city's transportation services, it would appear that
-as was hoped- a substantial proportion of patrons are relying on alternative means of access
to the stadium. SkyDome officials originally found that 54% of visitors were accessing the
stadium by either public transit or commuter train.54 More recently though, public transit
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usage has slipped to 30%, but only, according to David Garrick, as part of an equilibrium
process -that the downtown parking reservoir was underutilized. "People were finding that
there was lots of parking and they could get out fast."55 Garrick insist, though that the
leveling off of the modal split has not adversely impacted the area. "Nobody's complaining;
there's no gridlock." 56
SkyDome's Affect on Plans for the Railway Lands
While SkyDome has already impacted the City, the stadium has also affected plans for the
future of the Railway Lands. The announcement that the province would build a dome in the
middle of the Railway Lands came three years after the City had formalized these objectives
in the 1983 Railway Lands plan. One might expect that the dome announcement was met
with some frustration and anger by the City Planning Department. But on the contrary, the
decision to locate the stadium on the site, according to former Toronto City Planning
Commissioner Stephen McLaughlin, will allow the prescribed functions of the Railway
Lands to be more easily achieved.
The announcement of the stadium's siting had been preceded by two factors that
would have ultimately killed the 1983 Railway Land's development concept. One was a lack
of demand for either new office or retail space. The second -and related- major sticking
point was that, despite a conceptual framework that would foster the desired incremental
development, start-up capital costs (primarily in the form of infrastructure) would be
substantial. In light of the weak market, neither the City nor the Province were willing to
invest in capital projects for which returns were not guaranteed.
McLaughlin viewed the stadium's location on the Railway Lands as a means by
which these barriers could be overcome. With SkyDome, suddenly there was a demand for
the infrastructure -the stadium was the "critical mass" for which the Railway Land's
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planners had hoped. "What the dome did was pre-empt [the governments' earlier
reluctance], and they started building the infrastructure -which never would have been built
otherwise."57 Furthermore, McLaughlin points out that this stadium in no way
compromises the city's incremental approach to development; rather the stadium represents a
necessarily larger first increment that will make subsequent, modest developments feasible.
"Things don't always have to happen at the same pace. People think that 'incremental'
means you build little things all the time. Not necessarily. Sometimes you need a big thing
to make a whole bunch of little things happen. So there was a challenge of getting a critical
mass in place without destroying the sense of incrementalism."58 The stadium thus
represented a means of meeting this challenge.
The City of Toronto had to therefore consider the problem of how the area surrounding the
new downtown stadium ought to function given the sudden siting of a sports facility in its
midst. Given the popular conceptions of stadia as disruptive, unwanted land uses, it is
perhaps surprising that SkyDome has not affected the definition of traditional residential,
commercial, and office uses deemed appropriate for the area; rather, that the stadium
enhances the plausibility of the city's plan and can thus be used to achieve planning
objectives, and that unspectacular land uses provide an appropriate framework for the
stadium.
It was McLaughlin's position that the type and density of traditional urban functions
prescribed to the railway lands would go unchanged following the decision to site the dome
downtown. Canadian architect A.J. Diamond represents a most popular position in
suggesting that the uses of the Railway Lands ought to have been redefined on purely
functional grounds; "football fans will probably not enhance Class A office development,
and noisy crowds will not make for a wonderful residential environment. "59 McLaughlin
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counters that he was not at all concerned about combining the stadium with residential and
office uses, despite one of the initial attractions of the dome site being its removal form any
existing residential areas.
Driven by McLaughlin's initial position that the city's pre-stadium objectives for the
lands be pursued, the Planning Department spent several years reconsidering the distribution
of land uses. The land use designation arrived at by 1991 represents what Planner Robert
Gosse refers to as a "rationalized" land-use concept. (Compare Figures 3.10 and 3.11) The
term applies to several aspects of the plan. First, in keeping with the objective of blending
land uses on site with those adjacent to the railway, the Planning Department used the
stadium's presence to better define the east-west progression of activities. As mentioned, the
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1985 plan proposed transferring residential densities to Spadina Avenue; the 1991 plan also
proposes that commercial densities be reallocated or removed in order to convert the sub-
centre to a residential area. As high-density residential sub-centers have been planned and
implemented successfully at major intersections throughout Toronto, this new designation
-resulting form the stadium's location- works towards the objective of including familiar
elements of the city into the Railway Lands.
A second, stadium-related land-use change from the 1985 plan was the relocation of
commercial in turn from Spadina Avenue to the area immediately surrounding the stadium.
This is a rational move for several reasons. As Gosse points out, the commercial area will
function as a mitigating buffer shielding residential uses along Spadina and further
westward. But equally significant is the anticipated synergy that will evolve where the
commercial densities are paired with the stadium.
The streets and blocks site plan was perhaps the most significant element of the early plans
for the Railway Lands, as the continuation of the city's circulation pattern was central to the
desire of meshing the Railway Lands into the city. Impacts of the proposed stadium on the
road plan could therefore have decimated the objectives for the site. Although some critics
disagree, 60 the stadium has in fact impacted the road system proposal to a minimal extent.
Comparing Figures 3.12 and 3.13, the only required adjustments to the original plan
include the removal of a portion of one secondary route along the rail corridor. Indeed, the
stadium takes advantage of the one pre-planned divergence from the gird pattern: the bulge
in the Esplanade designed to accommodate the pumping station (which was to be relocated
in favor of the stadium). As Stephen McLaughlin suggests, providing a stadium site
subsequent to the completion of the road plan had little impact, thus enabling the city to
progress in its plans for the Railway Lands. 61
In addition to reconsidering the land uses and street plans for the Railway Lands following
the stadium's siting, planners were also required to review guidelines for the built form that
would ultimately surround the facility. Although the area around the stadium will develop
physically after Skydome's construction, the plans for the area have changed only in that
they will work with the stadium in achieving a vision of the Railway Lands. Indeed, the
approach taken in the review has not been to deal with the Railway Lands as a "blank slate"
following the construction of SkyDome. On the contrary, City planning efforts have
exploited its presence to achieve the initial objectives that the area ultimately function as a
traditional center of mixed uses at a range of densities. In order for this objective to be
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maintained though, serious reconsideration of the first post-stadium plan (1985); in
particular of the spatial organization of land uses and the issues of urban design.
Major adjustments were made between the 1985 and 1991 plans on several
grounds. It was the Planning Department's position, upon re-evaluation of the 1985 plan,
the plan did not sufficiently consider the physical impact that the stadium would have on the
Lands. For example, the density displaced by the stadium was reallocated in its entirety
along Spadina Avenue. The 1991 plan review, however, points out that the subsequent
massing "would have violated the cone of heights descending from the central area
[downtown, to the east]" 62 Density was again reallocated or removed and height limits
along Spadina Avenue were subsequently reduced "to protect the integrity of the landmark
quality of the core." 63
Other revisions in the planned form for the Railway Lands were predicated on the
realization that, irrespective of the mission of achieving the City's objectives for the Lands,
the uniqueness of -and social significance awarded to an athletic facility would invariably
result in its affecting the definition of the area's character. In particular, the 1991 plan
review emphasized that the provision of the stadium enhances the importance of public
experience in the Lands; in its own right as a place of congregation, but also -as an addition
to the Convention Center, CN Tower, planned central park and Union Station- because it
reinforces the definition of the Railway Lands as a civic place.
The 1991 review therefore established principals emphasizing the definition of
streets as the primary public venue. Indeed, Robert Gosse suggested that it is the city's
intention that "the walk become part of the experience of going to the Dome."64 To this
end, guidelines were provided to enhance the pedestrian experience that would result form
walking between Spadina Avenue sub-Centre, Union Station (the primary transportation
node) and the stadium. These include streetscaping that "promotes the distinctive character
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1985 massing scheme
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of the area [and] sets a new standard of quality for the City" in recognition of the out-of
town visitors upon which the experience could leave a lasting impression, consistent
alignment of building facades, and built-to lines with maximum and minimum street wall
alignments to provide a sense of definition, volume and continuity to the streets. Functional
guidelines include the provision canopies along building facades, and courtyard "crush"
space immediately adjacent to the stadium. Animation of the well-sculptured public realm
would come from the street-oriented commercial spaces.
Another group of urban design recommendations concern the adjustment of the
massing schemes as conceived in the 1985 plan in proper respect for the stadium. The 1985
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1991 massing scheme
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plan would have resulted in distorted views of the stadium 65, and was generally inconsistent
with the landmark significance of the world's first retractable roof facility and with the
aforementioned social significance awarded most stadia. In revising the 1985 massing
proposal, the Railway Lands planners concentrated on framing and preserving views of the
stadium, in particular the roof, from the Gardiner Expressway and Harbourfront to the
south, and from the west along the Esplanade corridor (Compare Figures 3.14 and 3.15).
Height limits for parcels adjacent to the stadium were decreased substantially, in order that
no building rise above the lower lip of the stadium's retractable roof; note for example the
two "gateway" buildings proposed in the 1991 scheme. An effective graduation of building
6 5 City of Toronto: March, 1991, p. 39
heights have been achieved, such that they "step down" southward to the water and
eastward to the stadium. The 1991 plan therefore seeks to achieve the sub-centre concept
while providing a respectful, appropriate built context for this most prominent facility.
Retrospective Evaluations of the SkyDome Project
While participating in SkyDome's planning and design efforts, Stephen McLaughlin was
the quintessential advocate of the urban stadium. He felt that it was the skepticism
conveyed by Diamond and others that had relegated the stadiums to the suburbs for the past
two decades, thereby wasting a potential asset. As Commissioner of City Planing, his
position was that the stadium and all its activity would not only enable the city's objectives
for the lands to be achieved, but would bring to the Lands a definitive sense of place .
"That's what a city is. A city is noise and congestion and all kinds of things happening. If
you don't like that, you can live in the suburbs, and have a front yard and all that stuff. It's
all part of the hustle and bustle of the city."66 Indeed, McLaughlin viewed the stadium as
an opportunity to spur development of the Railway Lands, and as a way of generating a
sense of place that would in turn enhance the attractiveness of the lands for prospective
tenants and residents.
In hindsight, however, McLaughlin is not so sure these goals will be achieved, due
largely to the design of the stadium -although he concedes Robbie did incorporate many of
his concerns. While these may reflect the feelings of a disgruntled former City
Commisioner, McLaughlin's views are not without merit and reflect common opinions
about the stadium."SkyDome was made a lot shorter and thinner, but not as much as we
would like."67 McLaughlin continues to insist that the mitigation of grand and human
scales was possible, but that this simply was not accomplished. "Our battles over
SkyDome were about this... You can have a building of a huge scale that works at a tiny
scale; so you can see it from miles away and it works, or you can see it up close and it
6 6McLaughlin, Stephen: Conversation, Jan. 27, 1992
6 7McLaughlin, Stephen: Conversation, Jan. 27, 1992
works. Whereas this thing reads from the Gardiner Expressway, but you go up to it and its
still monumental."
He also suggests that the failure to mitigate the monumental with the urban, human
scales was a casualty of politics; the Provincial government ignoring him and failing to
influence Robbie in the initial design stages and the Mayor misconstruing McLauglin's
contentions as a move to kill the project. "I didn't want to kill it. I was just saying Why
don't you make it look nice?"' 68 Because they failed to respect his agenda of planning and
designing a truly urban stadium, McLaughlin concludes that they are insufficient given the
plans for the Railway Lands, and that SkyDome is therefore not the exemplary urban
stadium that it might have been.
Thus, SkyDome as initially planned was a wondrous project: planned from the outset as a
stretch beyond the limited imagination that constrained previous multi-purpose stadium
efforts, a statement that urban appropriateness did not die with the passing of the Golden
Age, and an example of how public and private sectors can come together to build a civic
landmark. But SkyDome is also a lesson in all that can sway even the grandest and best
intended schemes; that political and financial agendas can compromise or restrict efforts at
planning urban stadia.
6 8McLaughlin, Stephen: Conversation, Jan. 27, 1992
CHAPTER 4: Fitting the Stadium into the City
Figure 4.1
Pilot Field, Buffalo, NY
(Buffalo Development Companies)
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing planners and designers of urban stadia is the
mitigation of their physical impacts. While "new-old" ballparks such as Oriole Park,
Buffalo's Pilot Field (Figure 4.1), opened in 1988, and Cleveland's Gateway project
(Figure 4.2); scheduled to open in 1994) would seem to suggest the only viable stadium
design option in this respect, to not consider the efforts to mitigation SkyDome's physical
impact would be inappropriate for several reasons. First, as traditional ballpark advocate
Philip Bess has pointed out, the demand for traditional-style facilities is based on client
needs; given that needs may vary ,"it is [therefore] not at all certain that ballparks will
prevail over stadia." 1 The needs of Toronto's stadium proponents show that an outdoor,
baseball-only stadium is not appropriate for all circumstances. Secondly, in addition to its
roof, SkyDome incorporates other physical characteristics that differentiate it from its
predecessors and that must therefore be properly evaluated.
1Bess, Philip, City Baseball Magic. Minneapolis Review of Baseball, Madison, WI, 1989, p. 12
Figure 4.2
Cleveland's Gateway ballpark, to be completed by 1994
(HOK Sports Facilities Group)
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to assess how both conceptions of the
urban stadium address the problem of shape and scale.
Shaping the Urban Stadium
Baltimore's Oriole Park is one of the latest in a tradition of urban stadia who's designers
sought a replication of the Golden Age qualities of sensitivity and respect for the physical
realm. The fundamental feature of Golden Age ballpark's sensitivity is clearly -as
mentioned previously- their fit within the streets and blocks plan of their respective cities.
Their confinement within the existing urban settlement patterns forces them to abide by
the same restrictions as other urban buildings, and is therefore key to their "urban"
distinction. Aside from such functional consequences as vitalizing the adjacent areas and
optimizing pedestrian accessibility, their tight fit suggests to observers -more than any
other trait-the belonging of the buildings despite their purpose.
The fact that new-old projects have been able to replicate this critical
characteristic has thus formed the basis of their appeal -a consequence not unanticipated
by the Orioles organization. Since the Maryland Stadium Authority had acquired 85 acres
of land, there was no particular dimensions to which Oriole Park was forced to conform.
Indeed, a conventional modem, self-defined, circular shape had been assumed by the
Stadium Authority and by the principal architects, HOK.2 In advocating for a traditional-
style facility, Orioles owner Eli Jacobs and his stadium design Vice President, Janet
Marie Smith recognized that a key element to mitigating the stadium's physical presence
would be to emphasize how the stadium might overtly display a respect for its environs;
and that the most effective means of giving such an impression would be to impose the
stadium's basic physical property -its shape- to the restrictions of the city.
Thus, Oriole Park was not only situated immediately adjacent to two primary
streets, but further, Smith, Jacobs, and the stadium facility's planners insisted that it be
restricted such that it not only avoid impact upon (i.e. demolition of ) the warehouse, but
that it permit the reintroduction onto the site of the previously eradicated Eutaw Street.
Oriole Park's shape and its asymmetrical internal dimensions are thus a reflection of both
the existing network and of the order originally dictated for the city.
The success of Oriole Park's in this regard is perhaps best understood when
compared to other new-old projects that were shaped to supposedly achieve the same
sense of modest physical impact. As the first stadium built in decades to conform in
shape to the city's grid, Buffalo's Pilot Field -built four years prior to Oriole Park- is
considered a landmark structure (see Figure 4.1). Although there is no sense that the city
form was required to submit to the ballpark, neither is there as clear a sense of ballpark
2 Smith Jant-Marie, Vice President New Stadium Planning and Development, The Baltimore Orioles, Inc.,
Conversation, Jan. 23, 1992
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Figure 4.3
The Gateway Development Site
(Sasaki Associates)
responsiveness as is observable in Baltimore. In particular, the impression of the ballpark
submitting to the city's restrictions is not portrayed in its interior dimensions, as the
eccentricities typifying the interiors of traditional ballparks are not present here. The
stadium's symmetrical seating bowl and "distressingly predictable" 3 playing surface
remind one that the perceived sensitivity of a stadium relative to its surroundings is
expressed as much in its internal as its external dimensions. Unlike any of the Golden
Age ballparks or Oriole Park, Pilot Field's internal plan suggests that the fit of the
ballpark on the allocated land was not truly challenging- that, unlike the Golden Age
3Bess, p.9
parks it seeks to emulate, it is not a "natural" response to its confines. One therefore
wonders whether the decision to pursue a traditional style was one made by marketing
staff and not by designers.
Cleveland's Gateway is perhaps a more convincing example of how a stadium's
impact can be minimized when shaped in relation to the street grid. Restricted to 10.75
acres of land4 (Figure 4.3), this ballpark will be oriented such that the eastern seating area
is aligned with (and thus responsive to) to eastern street boundary, but curves around to
abruptly terminate the view of a street on the western edge. Like Camden Yards then,
Gateway is a facility who's minimal impact is reflected in both its external and quirky
internal footprint.
New Comiskey Park (Figure 4.4), built in 1989, is also argued by its architects to
have been penned in the mold of traditional ballparks - built to replace old Comiskey,
baseballs oldest facility. But in fact, it is in looking at this facility that one truly
appreciates the ability of Oriole Park, the Gateway (and even Pilot Field) to have been
shaped by their surroundings. Foremost, the stadium is buried in a sea of parking that has
converted streets into entrances. But the stadium (nay ballpark), regardless of parking, is
decidedly un-urban. "Its form is unaffected by the [lot boundaries], except for 35th street
over which it bridges to two ramps in a typical kind of anti-urban gesture."5
New Comiskey notwithstanding, the ability of new-old ballparks to conform to
the same physical restrictions imposed upon Golden Age ballparks is most surprising
when considering that the former represent not a total replication of the latter in ignorance
of modern society, but rather an elaboration of them to include modem amenities. For, as
Philip Bess notes, not all modern amenities are amenable to the patterns of urbanism that
make possible their intimacy, character, and modesty.6 But such features as sky boxes,
4 Sasaki Associates, Inc.: The Gateway Project: Urban Design Guidelines. May 9. 1991, p. 11
5Bess, p. 33
6Bess, p. 23
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Figure 4.4
New Comiskey Park, Chicago
(Chicago White Sox publicity photo)
Figure 4.5
Section of the Gateway ballpark
(HOK Sports Facilities Group)
multi-tiered restaurants, and expanded concessions are nevertheless unavoidable given
the revenue motive that drives new stadium construction.7
In this vein, the greatest challenge to the square footage needs of these new
ballparks has been the demand for totally unobstructed views. While team owners,
including Williams and Jacobs of the Orioles, have sought the application of the
traditional aesthetic, none are willing to resort to the traditional ballpark characteristic of
obstructed seating -for which a premium could not be charged. The design solution
applied to Gateway and Oriole Park has been taken form the modem stadia: to build
upper deck seating above and behind the lower seating rather than directly above it -thus
eliminating the unruly support pillars. While this solution has contributed to the volume
and expansiveness of modern stadia, the emergence of the new-old movement -the desire
for internal intimacy and conformity to existing site boundaries- has forced designers to
restudy the arrangement. The Gateway architects, according to preliminary plans, seem to
have arrived at a plausible concession (Figure 4.5) as they were able to fit an entirely
unobstructed seating arrangement in less than 11 acres of land while achieving a level of
intimacy somewhere between close confines of traditional ballparks and the cavernous
sense of post-war and modern stadia.
While the responsive shape has become the trademark of the new-old ballparks' urbanity,
the issue was also given considerable attention in the planning of SkyDome. Upon the
announcement that the Robbie scheme had been selected, a series of meetings were held
"to review the design and to express the City's concerns about the proposal" -one of the
greatest concerns being the stadium's shape. 8
Indeed, when convened, the stadium's designers and city planners were in
disagreement over the spatial needs for the stadium. Former Commissioner McLaughlin
7 Bess, p. 27
8 City of Toronto.: Railway Lands Part 11: Final Report on Rezoning Application for Precinct'A', City of Toronto
Planning and Development Department, Jan, 1986, p. 12
Figure 4.6
. Street plan following SkyDome's siting
- (Stadium Corporation of Ontario)
Toronto Inner Harbour
Figure 4.7
Street plan prior to SkyDome's siting
(Stadium Corporation of Ontario)
based his support of a Railway Lands stadium -in part- upon its fitting within the city grid
dimensions that were ultimately to be applied to the Lands. His basic objection to
Robbie's initial conception was that "the stadium was too fat" in that, like all stadia built
in the decades, it would substantially disturb the intended circulation patterns. Robbie, to
the contrary, insisted that the site was far too small to house a facility of such magnitude.
Ultimately, a compromise was reached whereby Robbie agreed to constrict the eastern
edge of the stadium so as to effectively terminate John Street, while -at the northwest
corner, the city agreed to realign the right angle bend in the Peter Street extension onto
the Land (Figure 4.6).9
The fact that the sides would reach a compromise on the building's shape is
perhaps a failure when compared to new-old projects, but SkyDome suggests progress
relative to the totally insensitive stadia of the previous two decades. Robbie was
ultimately restricted to 12 acres of land, and it in facts fits into the planned Railway Lands
street pattern. The problem, however, is that this does not appear to be the case, given
the pre-planned configuration of the roadways (Figures 4.6 & 4.7). A comparison of the
pre and post-stadium street plans show that the Esplanade's curve for example was pre-
planned, while John Street to the stadium's northeast was never planned for extension
onto the lands beyond pedestrian access; details reflecting the previously intended
maintenance of a regional water pumping station on the stadium site.
Thus although such was not the case, it appears as if SkyDome dictated these
alignments; the stadium's sought-after sensitivity consequently suffers. The City's efforts
therefore suggest that modern stadia can be shaped to respect the existing or planned
urban street fabric, but -unlike what is evidenced with SkyDome- the shaping of the
stadium by the streets needs to be entirely perceptible in order to achieve an impression of
minimized impact.
9 CIty of Toronto, Jan, 1986, p. 13
The Problem of Scale
While new-old ballpark designers have labored with the challenge of replicating as much
as possible the configuration of Golden Age ballparks, so to have they attempted to
replicate their urban scale.
This was achieved during the Golden Age largely by restricting the street-side
elevations of the ballparks to heights of roughly 50 feet, in conformance with those of
surrounding structures. Beyond this height, the remaining elevation, which varies in
Golden Age parks form roughly an additional 20 to 50 feet, have been set back
substantially (see Figures 4.8 & 4.9). Cleveland's Gateway boasts a quite comparable
elevation of 96 feet, with 20 foot setbacks at the 60 foot mark (Figure 4.10) Similarly,
Oriole Park's architects labored to restrict the height of the facility to that of the
warehouse (roughly 100 feet),10 and have set the stadium back above roughly the 70 foot
mark.11
As was the case with their shape, the fact that most new-old stadia have been able
to replicate the familiar scale of traditional ballparks is surprising given their modern
program. Compare the simplicity of Tiger Stadium's profile (Figure 4.9) to the complex
Gateway section (Figure 4.10), where loges, club seating and other provisions add three
decks to the building. As the sections also show, the means by which this added height is
hidden is to submerge the new-old facilities below the ground surface. Indeed, both
Oriole Park and Gateway will be built roughly 16 feet below grade.12 13 Oriole Park in
addition will house a substantial portion of its ancillary functions, including service
entrances and docks, below ground.
10 RTKL Associates, Inc.: Master Plan Progress Report: Camden Yards Sports Complex Development Plan for the
Maryland Stadium Authority. Nov. 8, 1988, p. 3.46
1 1RTKL p. 4.58; this represents preliminary design guidelines.
12 Paull, conversation, Jan. 20, 1992
13 Hellmuth, Obata, & Kassabaum, Sports Facilities Group: The Cleveland Indians Baseball Park. for the Gateway
Economic Development Corporation, September 5, 1991
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Figure 4.10
Gateway's seating bowl is set-back well within its footprint
(HOK Sports Facilities Group)
The design of elevations consistent in scale with surrounding urban buildings
therefore provides the opportunity for new-old stadia -like other buildings- to positively
influence the sense of space in the adjacent public realm. Pilot Field, for example, is
pressed directly against the adjacent street and coupled buildings on the opposite side of
the street, give it a definitive sense of volume. The affect has been labeled "a testament to
streetscaping." 14 Similarly, the eastern bleacher section of Cleveland's gateway will be set
back only 30 feet from East 9th street's curb,15 responding -like any building- to the
setbacks of other, buildings along the street and thus extending the street's vertical edge.
14 Muchnick, Irvin: "Rich Makes His Pitch", New York Times Mag azine. July 30, 1989, p.2 4
15Sasaki Associates, nc, p. 11
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Figure 4.11
Expanded Russell Street corridor
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
Oriole Park is perhaps the least successful at such a relationship, as the Russell Street
corridor -expanded to create a barriere betweenthe ballpark and the Ridgley's Delight
community- forces a large setback of the building, leaving a wasteland between the
ballpark and the street (Figure 4.11).
Gateway's western edge is perhaps the best example, though, of how a sports
facilities mass can be molded to respond to the street (Figure 4.12). Rather than following
the dimension of the seating bowl, the exterior is guided in its shaping by Ontario Street.
Architects have cleverly peeled the exterior ramps and office space from the structure
-again such that the ballpark adheres to the setbacks existing along the street.
Like the Oriole Park project and the Golden Age ballparks before it, both the
Buffalo and Cleveland projects have articulated their urban scale street elevations with
distinctly urban detailing to further minimize the impression of the facilities as anything
Figure 4.12
Gateway's edge along Ontario Street
(HOK Sports Facilities Group)
more than buildings. And in true traditional fashion, these detail were drawn from the
local vernacular. Pilot Field's designers, for example, have gone so far as to incorporate
limestone gargoyles similar to those found in the adjacent Ellicot historic district.
The Gateway in Cleveland borrows another effective design approach from Oriole
Park: wrapping its masonry facade around much of the massive walkway ramps to further
muffle the facilities scale (Figure 4.13). Here, both ballparks seem to have drawn on
lessons provided by new Comiskey (see Figure 4.4), where the walkways appear as
ungainly appendages. The independent appearance of these massive structures, with their
distinctly modern texture, undermine the designers' stated intentions of seeking a
Figure 4.13
Elevation along Ontario Street
(HOK Sports Facilities Group)
traditional, urban scale, while hiding from view almost all facade treatments that were
applied.
While scale considerations are effective in moderating the presence of the ballparks, they
are not at all a startling element of their design given the nostalgic approach of the new-
old movement. What is far more surprising -if not successful- was the similar
consideration given to SkyDome's facade.
As was the case with SkyDome's ultimate shape, the appearance of its elevations
represent a compromise between Robbie's initial conception and the city's desires. Figure
4.14 shows the elevation on Robbie's original design, resembling more a spaceship (and
thus almost all other contemporary stadia's facades) than an urban structure. The city
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Figure 4.14
Early conception of SkyDome's facade
(RAN Consortium)
countered by proposing that the elevations be made more compatible with the facades of
the Land's other future buildings. 16
As with the roof, SkyDome's facade sets it apart from previous multi-purpose and
domed stadia; if only to suggest what is possible. But while the initiative to create an
urban-friendly facade is commendable, and will help in relating the structure to its future
surroundings, the final solution is not successful in that the details are not enough to give
the building human scale.17 Although arguably "handsome and... attentively detailed", 18
SkyDome's facade may be insufficient in both quality and quantity to give the building an
urban essence in this regard.19 Nevertheless, the building suggests a respect for the urban
context unforeseen in a facility of such magnitude. As such, the success of the facade
detailing may lie in setting the lower bounds for future urban stadia and dome projects.
16 City of Toronto: Railway Lands Part I: Final Report on Rezoning Application for Precinct'A' City of Toronto
Planning and Development Department, Jan, 1986, p. 13
17 McLaughlin, Stephen, former Commisioner, City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, conversation,
Jan. 20, 1992
18Goldberger, Paul; "Double Header in Toronto: Batter Up, Top Down", New York Times, July 16, 1989, p. H29
19 Diamond, A.J. "Domed Stadium, Toronto" Canadian Architect, May, 1989, p.34
Thus, considerable attention was given to issue of making SkyDome, an unprecedented
modem sports facility, as urban friendly as possible. Not only then does its existence
suggest that multi-purpose, covered facilities are not an obsolete concept, but SkyDome
shows -despite its own insufficiencies- what might be possible in attempting to mitigate
the physical presence of future modern stadia. Paul Goldberger, New York Times
architecture critic insists "as urban context goes, this place is a good bit better than most
new stadiums." 20Unfortunately, efforts to mitigate SkyDome's physical impacts appear
to be exactly what they are, compromises, and the physical impact of the stadium's shape
on the surrounding street grid appears -to SkyDome's misfortune- to be forced. One can
only wonder how SkyDome would be perceived had the city's concerns been addressed
earlier in the design process.
Although each has its various strengths and weaknesses, the new-old projects,
including Oriole Park, also provide lessons about how the design of outdoor baseball
facilities could serve to minimize their monumentality while optimizing their presence.
Indeed, one lesson that can be drawn from these projects is that to define a facility as 'of
the traditional style' is insufficient in itself. Together the new-old ballpark projects
suggest what design applications are possible, which are effective, and equally important,
which should be avoided in shaping and scaling the ballpark to fit the urban
environment.
20 Goldberger, July 16, 1989, p. H29
CHAPTER 5: Stadium Location
Perhaps the most valuable lessons that can be drawn for both the SkyDome and Oriole
Park projects relate to the characteristics of their sites, as the problem of siting an urban
stadium are a challenge to any stadium project. It is not merely an issue of replicating the
physical location of existing, successful urban stadia. One must recall that many of the
stadia we consider to be time-honored urban places were, at the time of their construction,
built in burgeoning neighborhoods and have therefore helped to define the early character
of the surroundings. By contrast, to stamp a stadium into the aged urban landscape forces
well established social and economic patterns of activity to be altered dramatically.
In addition, what North Americans envision as 'the good city' and the policies
adopted to achieve these visions have changed markedly since the building of our
revered Golden Age ballparks. 1 It was not until the last of the traditional ballparks had
been built that landowners and residents across urban America had become so
disappointed with the effect of unbridled development on land values and on the quality
of life that they would adopt such rational measures as zoning and land use planning.
The challenge of successfully siting a stadium within the city today is therefore
great. Oriole Park, SkyDome and other new stadia show that, for many reasons, urban
centers may provide an excellent context in this age of stadium planning. The purpose of
this chapter then is to suggest the qualities of downtown locations that made these
projects feasible.
Access Advantages of Downtown Sites
Although widely assumed to be the biggest drawbacks associated with downtown sites,
issues of accessibility have shown to be the greatest virtues of both the SkyDome and
Camden Yards projects. Benefits include a demand outside of events for any facilities
1Bess, p. 23
that would need to be constructed in support of the stadia, and the opportunity to
capitalize on existing transportation infrastructure. These benefits and others are
evidenced in both vehicular and mass transit provisions for SkyDome, Oriole Park, and
other new, centrally located facilities.
Mass-Transit Opportunities of Downtown Sites
The most prominent advantages shared by both the Railway Lands and Camden
Yards, in the choice of the two sites, was the services available to both given their
adjacency to the Central Business District. Perhaps the most crucial of these services is
the extensive centrally-oriented mass transit networks -the importance of which goes
beyond generally superior site access. Indeed, it is integral to the urban stadium's
fundamental equation, as any improvements in mass-transit accessibility to a stadium
lead to shifts of the modal split away from the automobile, reducing land required for
parking and thus enhancing the financial feasibility of a downtown stadium. Thus, both
Oriole Park and SkyDome expose as a myth the idea that stadia by definition are in need
of huge tracts of land and, therefore, need be located in the suburbs. Rather, they imply
that stadia of the automobile age hoard land for parking because they are in the suburbs,
and that for reasons of efficient land usage, downtown transit capabilities should therefore
be capitalized upon.
Although both SkyDome and Oriole Park capitalize on their respective cities
existing transit provisions, they do nevertheless differ with regards to relative
accessibility. While the Camden Yards case may present a seemingly ideal transit access
scenario 2, one apparent drawback of providing on-site mass transit is that, to some extent,
it will negate one of the economic rationales that Evans Paull and economists suggested
renders an urban site advantageous. While one can envision, in the Toronto case, stadium
patrons being drawn to commercial establishments between the stadium and transit
2 Aun, Leslie: "New Orioles Stadium to Draw Major D.C. Dollars", Washington Business Journal, Apr. 1, 1991
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stations at Union Station and Spadina Avenue both before and after games (upon
development of the Railway Lands), a large proportion of fans accessing Oriole Park in
Baltimore will not be required to walk past any off-site establishments; although some are
likely to alter their direct routes to take in favorite establishments or perhaps some of the
nearby tourist attractions. But given "the economists warnings" 3 to plan environments to
capture stadium traffic, (although seemingly inconceivable) Oriole Park might have been
sited too close to public transit to achieve its full economic potential.
The ability of a stadium to utilize the city's existing transit system is an issue that
should be factored into site selection decisions, but as both of these projects have shown,
it is doubtful that such use can occur without improvements to the system. But both also
show that improvements to central transit facilities in conjunction with a stadium project
give efficient returns, as the improvements will be appreciated by thousands of urbanites
outside of event times or seasons. In particular, the transit provisions at Camden Yards
were substantially upgraded -the project, in fact, gave incentive to initiate the city's LRT
project, which will begin operations on Opening Day.
Vehicular Access and Parking
While both SkyDome and Camden Yards are served by centrally oriented transit
routes that improve accessibility and will diminish automobile usage, existing automobile
access is nevertheless a major advantage shared by both central sites. This advantage is
manifest in two ways. First, as was shown particularly in the Camden Yards case, major
CBD's are already serviced by interstates and other highways with frequent access and
egress points, designed to handle thousands of motorists in each direction on a daily
basis. Consequently, the expenditures required to provide access to a downtown stadium
will be minimal, particularly in comparison with the cost of improvements needed to
access most suburban locations. Maryland Stadium Authority Deputy Director Edward
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3Bess, p. 16
Cline pointed out that, in the case of Oriole Park, the cost of the downtown property
relative to suburban land was more than made up for in the difference between suburban
and downtown automobile access improvement costs.4
The second attractive aspect of central site vehicular access is the issue of efficient
expenditure of funds for improvements. As was the case with improved mass transit
access to downtown stadium sites, both cases show that any improvements required will
not only be used by stadium patrons, but also by the thousands of commuters who
currently use the roadways. In Toronto, this point has been used to justify the
Metropolitan Governments' $30 million participation in the project: Metro is the
beneficiary of the Railway Lands' infrastructure including a new bridge for Spadina
Avenue, rebuilt to include a streetcar line extension.
Extensive vehicular and mass-transportation facilities were major elements of the
respective downtown sites' feasibility, but another element that makes the downtown
stadium concept both plausible and attractive is the proximity of the sites to large existing
parking reservoirs. Both SkyDome and Oriole Park will rely heavily on the large number
of parking spaces that are within walking distance of the respective facilities. This not
only reduces substantially the land requirements for the stadia, as parking need not be
dedicated on site, but will allow for a more efficient dispersal of fans following games, as
egress is not limited to one or two exists but is instead spread along an extensive street
grid. Furthermore, the reliance on the existing reservoirs provides economic spin-off
benefits for existing businesses. Parking lots and garages that have operated on revenues
generated during the workday are now likely to increase their revenues substantially on
game days, while businesses that may not charge for parking during the day will find a
demand for spaces in the evenings and weekends during the seasons.
The availability and under-utilization of existing downtown parking reservoirs has
been an issue in the decision to locate other recent stadia projects downtown. Although
4 Cline, Edward, Deputy Director, the Maryland Stadium Authority, Conversation, Jan. 21,1992
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only half the design-capacity of major-league baseball stadia (19,000), planners of
Buffalo's Pilot Field needed only to provide half of the necessary spaces on site (in an
outfield garage; see Figure 4.1). Cleveland's Gateway ballpark (see Figure 4.3), like the
Toronto's SkyDome, will provide virtually no on-site parking beyond executive and VIP
spaces, relying almost totally on the CBD reservoir to the north.
Examples of zero on-site parking are, however, infrequent and not easily
replicated, as the Baltimore case shows. One reason for this is logistical: the Maryland
Stadium Authority's traffic consultant concluded that roughly 7,000 on-site spaces would
be required despite the high modal splits and nearby downtown reservoir (5,000 were
actually built but will likely disappear if the Stadium Authority builds a football stadium).
Another factor is economics: The financial realities of contemporary professional sports
also suggest that parking will be included in most future stadium programs, as owners
include access to parking revenues as part of the favorable deals negotiated with cities or
states. In Baltimore, for example, the Orioles will receive "all [on-site] parking revenues
generated in connection with baseball-related events at Oriole Park."5 It is thus easy to
understand why Orioles' owner Edward Bennett Williams was not receptive to the City's
recommendation of a Camden Yards site half the size of the current site.6
The issue of parking provisions is not one in which benefits are accrued only by
the sports facilities though. Rather, one finds in the provision of on site parking, the same
reciprocity characterizing vehicular and transit access provisions that would be
unattainable in a suburban location. Edward Cline of the Stadium Authority anticipates
future agreements with major downtown employers, including The University of
Maryland (four blocks away), which is planning major expansions and has expressed
interest in use of the lot for employee parking. 7 Other uses for the parking beyond
5Maryland Stadium Authority; Baltimore Orioles, Inc.: Memorandum of A2reement Between the Maryland Stadium
Authority and Baltimore Orioles. Inc., May 2, 1988, p. 12
6Cline, converstation, Jan. 20, 1992
7line, conversation, Jan. 20, 1992
103
stadium events are likely considering, in particular, its adjacency to transportation
facilities and proximity to other downtown attractions and businesses.
Thus, what one finds in examining the Baltimore example is that facilities (that
would be built as part of most stadium projects) bear special utility for the public given
their construction downtown -as was the case with transit and highway provisions. But
given that the parking is a revenue generating element managed by the Stadium
Authority, having been built downtown, it has become a means by which the Stadium
Authority can generate additional returns of the public's investment into the sports
facility. Ironically, in this regard Oriole Park is following examples set by some of the
modern stadia it seeks to displace. Cincinnati's Riverfront Stadium, built in 1968
developed 4,500 on-site parking spaces that are leased to downtown workers at $20 per
month, as compared to rates five times higher for many downtown lots. 8
The Baltimore and Toronto cases suggest other economic advantages that can
result form using the utilization of a CBD's transportation facilities. The accessibility
associated with the downtown sites (as opposed to suburban locations) allows the primary
tenants to maintain their already strong regional followings while preserving the equally
vital inner-city fan base9 -an effect that will benefit both the teams and the respective
municipalities. Both facilities, for example, are much closer to regional and national
passenger train service than the facilities they replace. Oriole Park is in addition actually
more accessible by automobile to its important regional base than Memorial Stadium:
Virtually no navigation of city streets is required to access the former, while the latter is
buried amidst a residential neighborhood in the middle of the city. Consequent to this
improved access, the Maryland Department of Economic and Employment Development
estimates that spending by out-of-state Orioles fans could double over the 1985 estimate
of $36 million. 10
8 Petersen, David: "Thinking About a Downtown Stadium for Baltimore", Urban Land Sept. 1988, p. 2 1
9 Petersen, p. 23
10Aun, p. 2
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Compatibility with Existing Downtown Land Uses
Although the access advantages associated with a downtown site are extensive, they do
not represent the full extent of downtowns' offerings. Both SkyDome and Oriole Park
suggest that professional sports facilities also ought to be located downtown such that
they may be integrated functionally with other uses traditionally located in urban centers.
As mentioned, in the case studies both projects add to their respective cities'
already large number of centrally located tourist attractions. SkyDome, in particular is
situated next to Toronto's most popular attraction, CN Tower, consequently, the two are
effectively packaged as a single destination both during and outside of game times.
Further, both the SkyDome and Oriole Park projects not only add to a mass of centrally
located tourist destinations, but compared to the predominately residential suburbs, they
are compatible with the ancillary functions, including hotel, dining, and retail activities
that have evolved in support of these attractions.
The combination of dome and convention centers, another function traditionally
located downtown, is an opportunity that has played a role in the siting of many recent
dome stadium projects. Vancouver, for example, built B.C. Place as part of its 1986
World Exposition. More recently, St. Louis residents have approved construction of a
$250 million facility that can converted from a convention center into a football
stadium,11 and Atlanta's Georgia Dome will be constructed adjacent to the World
Congress Center (Figure 5.1). Perhaps the most successful venture of this type to date has
been the Indianapolis Hoosierdome (Figure 5.2). The stadium was built primarily to
attract a National Football League franchise (ultimately luring away Baltimore's Colts),
but is also an integral element of the city's convention facilities. In addition to providing
another 150,000 square feet of exhibition space, the dome shares management, staff, and
parking with the convention center. This shared relationship not only improves the
1 1Deckard, Linda: "St. Louis to Construct Center That Converts Into Stadium", Amusement Business, v. 102, Apr. 16,
1990, p. 15
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Vigure 5.1_
Georgia Dome, scheduled to be completed in the Fall of 1992 -(Georgia Dome publicity photo)
Figure 5.2
Hoosier Dome, Indianapolis
(Editorial Research Reports)
attractiveness of both facilities, but allows the Hoosierdome to keep its debt servicing and
operating costs much lower than those of other dome facilities. 12 Other advantages of
shared dome-convention center projects are, particularly in the St. Louis case, that such a
tie makes the dome a recipient of hotel/motel tax monies and other business tax income
that would not logically support a sports facility. 13
SkyDome achieves a similar relationship. As it is (at least optionally) a dome
facility, it can also function in collaboration with the city's adjacent, 200,000 SF
Convention Centre, which prior to the stadium's construction, had sought to expand.
SkyDome's versatility enhances the Convention Centre's marketability by providing
supplemental space up to an additional 200,000 SF, and can draw such space intensive
uses as home and boat shows that would have been impossible to attract to the
Convention Centre alone. Expositions attracted in collaboration with the Convention
Centre comprise a substantial proportion of SkyDome's event dates and are therefore
important to its annual operating revenues.
As an outdoor facility designed specifically for baseball, Oriole Park will not
share the same collaborative advantages as downtown dome facilities, despite its location
within two blocks of the Baltimore Convention Center. And although the Maryland
Stadium Authority is expecting to build a dome for any football franchise acquired for the
city, Edward Cline suggests that difficulties have already arisen in attempts to establish
relations with the Convention Center Authority. For one, the fact that the dome -if
constructed- would not be immediately adjacent to the Convention Center creates
logistical problems; neither side is completely convinced of the ability of a shuttle service
to effectively link the two facilities. Furthermore, Cline has says that the Center's
authorities perceive a dome to be a competing facility and not as a growth opportunity14
-these problems relative to other facility tandems suggesting that the key to cooperative
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12 Petersen, p. 22
13 Deckard, p. 15
14Cine, Jan. 22, 1991
operations (as in Indianapolis) may lie in combined management and immediate
adjacency.
Siting a Stadium to Guide Downtown Development
In addition to taking advantage of (and enhancing) downtown transportation provisions
and land uses, recent stadium projects, including SkyDome and Oriole Park have shown
the ability to guide the growth of cities' central business districts.
Attracting Development
The fact that several sports facility projects have shown to be magnets to real
estate development also signifies the importance of understanding how a sports facility
can be sited to affect a cities' physical growth. The most widely cited example of this
effect has been the Louisiana Superdome in New Orleans, who's impact on the
development landscape has been measured in several ways. Using increases in land
values as a measure of real estate development, the Superdome has been found to have a
positive effect on CBD land values for a distance of up to 2,200 feet, leading researchers
to conclude "[n]o urban renewal project in the history of New Orleans is likely to have
beneficially impacted a surrounding area as has the development of the Louisiana
Superdome."i 5
The Superdome and other facilities have also been charged with affecting the
location of office development with their ancillary functions, especially parking which,
given the rarity of events scheduled during working hours, is available for outside usage.
Portions of the parking requirements for the seven office buildings constructed near the
Superdome between its opening in 1975 and 1985 have been satisfied by space available
in the facilities garage. Specifically, the projects were collectively able to avoid building
4,460 spaces on-site; resulting in a higher yield of leasable office space and a construction
15Nebel III, E.C.; Ragas, W. R.; Ryan, T.P.: The Economic Impact of the Louisiana Superdome (1975-1985), Division
of Business and Economic research, University of New Orleans, 1985, p. 17
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savings of $42.4 million (1985).16 Similar opportunities provided by Cincinnati's
Riverfront Stadium have been central to the City's ongoing efforts to strengthen the CBD.
Thus, while it is clear that any effect on real estate development fails to offset the
Superdome's drain on the taxpayers,17 and arguable whether either Riverfront Stadium or
the Superdome has actually initiated the office projects (that office construction might
have occurred irrespective of the stadia's construction) 18, it is clear that both stadium
provided location incentives, suggesting that urban stadium site selections should reflect
this potential affect.
Adapting Lands for New Development
Both the SkyDome and Oriole Park cases also suggest development opportunities for
tracts of industrial properties that, given the emergence of the service sector economy,
have grown obsolete and incompatible with growing central business districts; scenarios
that currently exist throughout urban North America. Indeed, they "open the door" for
expansion of their cities' CBD's onto these challenging sites.
Industry in Camden Yards for example, while operating successfully, contrasted
with uses that might occupy adjacent, City-owned parcels along the western edge of the
CBD (Figure 5.3). Replacing the northern portion of the industrial site with the ballpark
serves to shield the remaining industry from the city's commercial areas and opens up
new development opportunities for the area. "The stadium... is turning an area with an
image of going downhill into an area that has an image of being a good place to invest." 19
Furthermore, according to one planner, replacing the industry in the northern edge of the
site has increased the attractiveness of the City's vacant, adjacent parcels. 20
16Nebel et al. p. 19
17 Petersen, David
18 Lancaster, Hal : "Stadium Projects are Proliferating Amid Debates Over Benefit to Cities", Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 20, 1987 p. 3 7
19 Paull, conversation, Jan. 20, 1992
20 Bose, Shubroto, Director of Architecture and Planning, City of Baltimore Development Corporation, conversation,
Jan. 23, 1992
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Figure 5.3
Industry in Camden Yards prior to the ballpark's construction
(Baltimore Planning Department)
In Toronto, the economic shift away from the once rich industrial sector towards
the financial and tourist sectors has led to explosive growth of its central business district
and waterfront, while simultaneously undercutting the utility of the Railway Lands. And
as this shift has progressed, the Lands have grown increasingly obtrusive. As Stephen
McLaughlin considered in his coordination of the planning of SkyDome and the Railway
Lands, the stadium provided the vital first step in opening the Railway Lands to the city
by acting as a bridge on the Lands between the downtown and the waterfront, and by
initiating the clean up and infrastructure undertakings that had previously stifled
development of the lands.
109
6T
re
B&O.WAREHOUSE
Figure 5.4
Camden Yard s on-site development opportunities
(RTKL Associates, Inc.)
Capturing the Benefits of Subsequent Development
While the 'magnet effect' has been anticipated in the planning of Oriole Park, the project
brings an interesting elaboration of the concept: that much of the development attracted
to the parking and other services can be captured on-site and can subsequently off-set (to
some extent) the costs of the stadia. The Maryland Stadium Authority's long-term plans
call for construction of a football stadium on the existing surface lot and relocation of
some portion of the displaced parking into new on-site garages. But planners have also
identified other development opportunities on site (Figure 5.4). By retaining parking on-
site, the Sports Complex should, given proper market conditions, be able to attract
development in much the same way that has been witnessed in Cincinnati and New
Orleans. However, since the Stadium Authority holds title to the land, they could either
110
LZ
Pr
sell or lease it in an effort to help offset the costs of original land acquisition. (In
addition, the on-site parking also will facilitate leasing of the 400,000 SF of office space
in the renovated Camden Warehouse).
The stadium project and its ancillary facilities have also brought much attention to
air-rights development possibilities for the area above the rail platforms, east of the
warehouse (Figure 5.4; Zone A). Current plans call for a 2 million SF medical market
/exhibition center, developed by the Stadium and Transportation Authorities that would
also share space with an expanded convention center on the eastern side of Howard
Street, and is likely to include a hotel in its program. While the facility seems to be a
logical compliment to the convention center, some credit the stadium complex for its
conception and location. "That kind of project would never have been discussed before
[the ballpark's planning]" 21 -further testament to the importance of siting stadia with
respect for the greater urban development implications.
Capturing development opportunities as part of the sports facility project has been
proposed for other state-of-the art facilities and new-old ballpark projects. In Phoenix,
developers included a multiple-use, retractable roof facility as one element of a 66 acre
mixed-use project. While the City would have been obligated to donate the land in the
deal, the developer contended that including the stadium as merely one element of a
larger project would allow a total exclusion of public funding for the stadium.22
Cleveland's traditional-style Gateway ballpark provides another example (Figure 5.5).
The ballpark is in fact merely the anchor of an economic development initiative for the
site that will, in addition, provide developable lots. The entire project was laid out "to
respond to market forces" of the CBD bordering to the north.23
21 Paull, conversation, Jan. 20, 1992
2 2Engdahl, Lora: "Pursuing Private Development: The Ganis Game Plan", Facility Manager, Summer, 1986, p. 11
2 3Sasaki Associates, Inc.: The Gateway Project: Urban Design Guidelines, May 9, 1991, p. 24
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Figure 5.5
Development opportunities on the Gateway site
(Sasaki Associates)
Thus, SkyDome an Oriole Park at Camden Yards, as well as other recently conceived
stadium projects provide clues as to how a facility can be effectively sited in cities.
Specifically, they suggest that stadia planned for cities should, in contrast to previous
efforts, be planned not in isolation but in consideration of existing elements of the city. In
particular, the examples cited here suggest that, in contrast to widely held dispositions for
suburban locations, the most effective sites for stadium may be in or adjacent to the CBD.
Yet, the key to their central location is that -unlike many earlier stadium efforts- they are
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not islands in an urban sea but are instead functionally and integrally tied in with facilities
already existing downtown. Recent stadium projects, including SkyDome and Camden
Yards show that existing transportation facilities and land uses, and the potential of
guiding future downtown development are all important virtues of downtown stadium
sites.
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CHAPTER 6: Affecting a Sense of Place
In addition to the problems already addressed, there is a less quantifiable problem
associated with planning the urban stadium. The ability of a sports facility to influence
our perceptions of place is clearly not an issue that guided modem and post-war stadium
projects, but Oriole Park and Camden Yards, in addition to others, provide cues as to how
a sports facility can enhance the character of their respective host neighborhoods.
Specifically, both (in addition to other projects) suggest that affecting a sense of place
involves an appropriate definition of the stadium's uses, and also requires that
consideration be given to the planning of the surrounding area. The purpose of this
chapter is in examination of these issues, to suggest how a stadium can positively affect
the character of the area it inhabits.
The Mixed Use Stadium
The crucial element in using a stadium to create an interesting place is to reconsider its
functions. Perhaps the most important lesson as to how stadia in this regard might
positively affect a sense of place is to reflect upon the failures of recent urban stadium
efforts. It is clear, however, that the failure of the stadia was representative of the failed
school of thought from which they were planned. Consequently, any subsequent urban
stadium efforts need reflect the accepted, emerging school of thought.
Post war stadia were products of philosophy pushing radical functional and
physical reconfigurations of urban centers. With the establishment of the automobile and
construction of highways upon which to commute, middle and upper income residents
fled the confines of the city in search of the half acre American dream. The consequence
of this flight was devastating for urban centers. "The shells of... cities were getting to look
like black and white newsreels of the Great Depression."1
1Frieden, B.J., Sagalyn, L.B. Downtown Inc.. How America Rebuilds Cities. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990, p. 13
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Declaring the obsolescence of the urban center's traditional pattern of land uses,
urbanists and urban politicians alike resorted to the drastic conclusion that "the task was
to renovate entire neighborhoods to provide a completely new land-use pattern." The
aims of the establishment were therefore to reinvent the city for those activities and
people deemed both necessary and appropriate; "cities were building projects for a
narrow band of users more than for the public at large."2 Projects were designed and
programmed to attract this "narrow band" who could afford to visit or live in these
renewal projects but who remained wary of the downtown environment and social
contingent. To ensure their attractiveness, the charge to architects and planners was
therefore to design projects that resulted in minimal interaction between the new and the
old; "to avoid any features that might prove attractive to casual visitors."3 Furthermore, to
mix uses, given the precedent set by the decaying downtowns, was taboo; experience had
shown, it was argued, that city planning provide a rational separation of obviously
incompatible land uses.
Two subsequently prominent features typified the mid-century, urban renewal-era
stadium: They were planned to serve a single function, and emphasized their separation
from the surrounding city. Concrete donuts impressed into these urban centers epitomize
the ideals of urban renewal planners. Their functions are in fact no different than any
project from the urban renewal era: Bring people in from the suburbs by guaranteeing
desired activities sheltered from the prevailing urban environment. Suburbanites traveling
to St. Louis' Busch Stadium could be assured that since the facility was nothing more than
a sporting venue, that they need not worry about encountering anyone except thousands
of other sports enthusiasts. And once inside the facility, they would be sealed off from the
unpleasant, disturbing city around them; there would be no cues piercing the edifice to
suggest that they were anywhere besides a baseball of football game.
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2Frieden & Sagalyn; p. 39
3Frieden & Sagalyn; p. 39
It is this one-dimensional quality of urban renewal projects, including stadium
projects, that would contribute to the movement's demise. There was little to offer the
average person beyond possibly a cubicle in an anonymous tower from which to escape
for home at 5pm, or a show or game from which to drive directly to and from with no
diversions. The organization of activities was too rational, too efficient. Recounted one
critic: "Pittsburgh residents", who despite having been bestowed their own downtown
donut, "do not dawdle downtown, or come back down there after work and on
weekends... there is little to attract or hold people there." 4 Modem urban stadia continue
to exist as the classic example. "With the exception of the time there are events in them,
they are black holes."5
These cold lifeless environments spirited a reconsideration of the virtues of the
urban environment and consequently, of the urban stadium. In attempting to rectify all the
ills of the city, "it is so easy to fall into a trap of contemplating a city's uses one at a time,
by categories." 6 To do so, argues Jane Jacobs among other theorists in reaction to modem
planning, is to ignore and hinder the diversity that is natural to big cities. Rather, she
contends, the fundamental unit of the city must be a mixture of uses -that no part of the
city be defined by one use.
Thus, it is this emergent notion of the urban order of activity to which future
urban stadium projects must prescribe -if they are to disassociate themselves from the
urban renewal conceptions with which (to this day) they are commonly associated. And
both Oriole Park and SkyDome give clues as to how this is achieved. In stark contrast the
autonomy and single purpose nature deliberately programmed into modem urban stadia,
both SkyDome and Camden Yards seek to breach the formal boundary between city and
project -to positively affect the sense of place by defining themselves as more than sports
facilities.
4 Frieden & Sagalyn; p. 59
5 Smith, Janet-Marie, Vice President New Stadium Planning and Development, The Baltimore Orioles, Inc.,
conversation, Jan. 23, 1992
6Jacobs, Jane: The Death and Life of great American Cities, Vintage Books, New York, 1961, p. 143
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Those who planned Camden Yards recognized that the notion of the urban
stadium stretches far be-yond the aesthetic for which the stadium is lauded, to include to
functional concerns stressed by Jacobs and others. Janet Marie Smith contends that a
great deal of effort was put into avoiding not only the aesthetic monotony, but also the
functional monotony planned into modern and post-war stadia. Camden Yards' planners
feel they have successfully countered the "black hole" stigma of urban sports facilities by
integrating it into a larger program of activities that simply replicate the mix found
throughout the city; the shops, restaurants and bars on the ground floor of Camden
Warehouse, fully accessible to (and hoping to feed off of) the general urban population;
and the hundreds of thousands of square feet of office space on the upper floors,.
providing streams of traffic to and from the site at the beginning and end of the work day
and at lunch hour. In stark contrast then to the declared obsolescence of traditional urban
land use patterns that defined the functions of contemporary stadia, Camden Yards uses
this pattern as a model of what constitutes an interesting, genuinely urban place.
Similarly, SkyDome follows former Toronto City Planning Commissioner
Stephen McLaughlin's vision that it must prove its worthiness to more than sports
enthusiasts. Relative to the domes that preceded it, SkyDome is not self-serving, rather its
range of functions -its shops, recreation facilities, dining establishments, and conference
centers- is defined in anticipation of urban fabric of employment and residential functions
that will ultimately surround it.
Thus, its primary function differs with that of Oriole Park (multi-use versus
baseball-only facility), but SkyDome conforms to the ideal put forth by the Baltimore
ballpark, and thus challenges the assumption that an "urban stadium" is defined by the
aesthetic and primary purpose. Functionally, both are contextual; Oriole Park relating to
the context of the old, existing city, SkyDome relating to the city of tomorrow. This
suggests that the definition of the "urban stadium" is largely based on whether the facility
has anything to offer the people of the city beyond sports or trade shows.
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Figure 6.1
Many of SkyDome's activities are on its northern edge, facing a railway corridor
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
Figure 6.2
There are no land uses facing Bremner Boulevard, along SkyDome's southern edge
(Terry Fraser-Reid)
While SkyDome and Oriole Park provide lessons as to how functionally blending
a stadium project into a city can reinforce its attractiveness and sense of belonging,
equally as much can be learned from understanding the shortfalls of both projects.
Although SkyDome, for example, houses a plethora of activities that will cater to the
future residents and businesses of the Railway Lands, it is the orientation and location of
these uses that is problematic. For it is insufficient to merely include these activities -they
must be located conspicuously, in places where they will attract passers-by and will
contribute to the vitality of the area. SkyDome has only one elevation (the north) that
does not front a public circulation route. Yet it is here that all of SkyDome's "publicly
accessible" activities -the hotel, restaurants and bars- have been located (Figure 6.1),
squeezed between the stadium and a rail corridor while the stadium's frontage along the
Esplanade -the Railway Lands' Main Street- remains totally unanimated (save a
McDonald's; Figure 6.2).
Long after the Railway Lands are built out, there will be no randomness
associated with these backside uses, as there would be no reason to venture there unless
one already knew their destination. Furthermore, the decision not to provide these uses
along the Esplanade will detract from the randomness and vibrancy of the street's life,
hindering -rather than improving- the character of the urban setting. Indeed, the
opportunity to positively affect the environment by giving SkyDome a life beyond its
primary purpose has thus not been optimized.
Such shortcomings lead one to question whether the attempt to functionally
integrate SkyDome into the city fabric was an appropriate or necessary means of
attempting to enhance the quality of the place it inhabits. Such large scale projects as
European gallerias and North American railway stations (such as New York's Grand
Central) prove that a large scale facility can enhance a sense of place by expressing
(rather than attempting to conceal) monumentality and distinctive functional
characteristics. SkyDome does attempt to captalize on its physical and functional status
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Figure 6.3
Eutaw Street pedestrian corridor
(Washington Post)
by providing massive (if not appealing) sculptures protruding out of its northern corners,
treminating the Peter and John Street views; but these seem only to be comprimise
between desired modesty and true grandeur. Design critic A.J. Diamond feels a complete
approach was warranted in SkyDome's case. "The stadium being monumental in size and
character, requires an appropriately large urban setting, not a situation in which its
prominence in the city is camouflaged."7 Yet to plan a stadium in such a way comes
dangerously close to repeating the imposing white elephant quality of its predecessors.
Diamond feels that a successful approach would have been to replicate the effective
qualities of the city's other civic monuments, including the old and new city halls, and
7Diamond, A.J. "Domed Stadium, Toronto" Canadian Architect, May, 1989, p.32
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Queen's Park: each of these (and only these) places sit astride the street grid, and have
public space as a forecourt apron.
Neither were Camden Yards' planners totally successful functionally integrating
the ballpark site into the city. Although publicly-accessibility to uses along the
maintained Eutaw Street corridor (between the ballpark and warehouse; Figure 6.3) is an
interesting means by which to weave these activities into the surrounding urban mix, it is
unfortunate that this represents the extent of the ballpark's offerings. Baltimore City
planners have expressed regret that the ballpark does not take advantage of its Camden
Street frontage by providing uses there for the general public. 8 In conjunction with the
establishments opening up along the opposite side of the Camden/Russell Streets public
square, such uses would have given an interesting character and sense of activity to the
space both during and outside of event times. As a Golden Age model, Fenway Park
exemplifies the positive affect that a park's mixed usage can have on a place. Because of
the street-oriented office and commercial establishments, the site contributes to the
activity of the area, while one can walk down Brookline Avenue and not sense a
distinction between the block upon which the ballpark sits and any other sections of the
street. By not providing these uses, Oriole Park's planners have thus fallen short in their
attempts to similarly establish the park as a fully active part of the city.9 Thus, like
SkyDome, Oriole Park reminds us (in its shortcomings) that the urbanity of sports
facilities goes beyond the aesthetic.
Creating Sports Districts
Another approach available to planners in their efforts to find an effective relationship
between sports facility and its host area is to define that area as a sports district -an effect
that can be achieved by combining the facility with other sports facilities.
8 Bose, Shubroto, Director of Architecture and Urban Design, The Baltimore Development Corporation, conversation,
Jan. 24, 1992
9Sasaki Associates, Inc.: The Gateway Project: Urban Design Guidelines. May 9, 1991, p. 8
120
Figure 6.4
Gateway's pedestrian routes link with Cleveland's historical arcades
(Sasaki Associates)
The ability of any single-purpose sports facility to define a sense of place is
difficult, as baseball is played (at the most) 81 days a year, basketball and hockey 40
each, and football only eight times annually. Building these facilities in close proximity is
thus a means of achieving a critical mass. In addition to the Camden Yards example,
where the Maryland Stadium Authority hopes a football domed stadium will soon join
Oriole Park, several other new stadia compliment -or will be complimented by- other
sports facilities. The Georgia Dome, for example, is adjacent to the Omni basketball and
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hockey arena, thus serving to characterize downtown's southern edge as the city's sports
region. A more comprehensive initiative is the Cleveland Gateway project, where the
mentioned new-old ballpark will be built in conjunction with a new 20,000 seat
basketball arena.
While combining sports facilities may be a means of defining an area's character,
so too does the approach increase the importance of maintaining a diverse set of uses for
the area -of avoiding the anti-urban, megastructure problems of self-centeredness and
singular purpose. Gateway and Camden Yards seem to share a common approach in
dealing with this danger, as both projects will weave urban activities deep through their
respective sites. As mentioned earlier, The Maryland Stadium Authority may develop
sites between the ballpark and the football stadium site. Similarly, Gateway's planners
have maintained a cross axis on the site- the paths linked to the surrounding street system
(Figure 6.4). Lining these routes will be pedestrian oriented commercial uses, as well as
upper-story hotels and offices that will bring the public onto the site outside of event
times.
The Character of the Surroundings
Like any activity or structure in the city, the ability of a sports facility to relate to -and to
enhance the sense of- the area it inhabits is not totally self-determined, but is also a
function of the characteristics of these surroundings, both functional and physical.
Complimentary Form of the Surroundings
While the land use relationships between stadium and neighborhood are significant in
determining the affect of the stadium on the area's character, equally important is the
issue of how the area's built form relates to the sports facility.
With the locating of SkyDome in the Railway Lands, Toronto's city planners were
presented with a unique opportunity to enhance the dialogue between the stadium and
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Figure 6.5
The proposed 660,000 SF Health Care Finance Administration building(RTKL Associates)
surroundings by considering the latter in respect of the former. Built into a barren
attractive development site, SkyDome has been allowed to dictate the ultimate physical
character of the Railway Lands. The City's planners have respectfully reorganized the
massing to properly frame the important civic structure, but also to put the stadium's mass
in a dense, urban context (thereby minimizing its visual impact) while maintaining the
city's familiar nodal development pattern.
Although Camden Yards is situated in a markedly different urban context
-established urban forms already in place around the stadium- so too were there
opportunities to plan the city's form in response to the stadium. In fact, the four city-
owned, vacant properties between the ballpark and the CBD, and the development rights
above the Camden rail platform provide a unique situation: an undeveloped immediate
context amidst a dense city fabric. However, concepts released for these lots since the
construction of Oriole Park suggest that -as with their neighborhood redevelopment
plans- the City is doing little in terms of changing their intentions for the sites. The Health
Care Finance Administration building proposed for the site north of the ballpark, (Figure
6.5) .has not been subjected to any new zoning regulations requiring street-side
commercial provisions that might help animate the streets adjacent to the ballpark; in
conjunction with the mentioned lack of street-side provision on the ballpark site, Camden
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Figure 6.6
The view of Camden Yards from the Inner Harbor following air rights construction
over the rail platforms.
(Ayers/Saint/Gross, Inc.)
Street will be less interesting a place -both during and outside of game times- than it
might have been. Furthermore, allowable densities for Medical Market facility likely to
be constructed over the rail terminal air-rights will almost totally obstruct the views of the
ballpark and warehouse from adjacent downtown streets (Figure 6.6 ). Indeed, the fact
that development guidelines for these developable properties have gone unchanged leaves
open the dangerous opportunity, as one planner suggested, for the city to "turn its back"
on its exciting new gem.' 0
There is of course an alternative evaluation of this situation -relating it to the
planning and design principles that guided the Oriole Park project. Traditional-style
ballpark enthusiasts might argue that the City's maintenance of area design guidelines
merely speaks to the contextual sensitivity of the ballpark. Like any building, it does not
dictate the growth of the city around it; rather, the ballpark will be increasingly at home
as the city continues to evolve unaffected. This view would also point out then, in
contrast, that the City of Toronto's need to reform the massing schemes subsequent to
SkyDome's construction merely speaks to its insensitivity.
10Huhn, Barry, Associate, RTKL Associates, conversation, Jan. 22, 1992
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Public Space Links
Providing quality public space in the areas around sports facilities (in the form of
both streets and open spaces) is another means by which urban stadia can forge a link
with the areas they inhabit.
As the quality of the pedestrian experience is a substantial contributor to one's
perception of place, the tremendous pedestrian traffic generated by urban sports facilities
ought to therefore force a consideration, in the planning stages, of the experience of
approaching the facility. Again though, in examining this concept as a component of
urban stadium planning, one finds no correlation with aesthetic differences between
projects. Indeed, the City of Toronto's "rationalization" of the Railway Lands land use
plan was based in part on the premise that the experience of going to SkyDome ought not
be limited to its footprint. Ultimately, recollections of a visit to SkyDome should include
the walk to the stadium along streets alive with shops, restaurants, and bars to which one
might wander. To the contrary however in Baltimore, the experience of the walk to the
ballpark for many will be limited to a two hundred yard trip past the warehouse to the rail
platforms. And it seems, based on the City's laissez-faire planing efforts, little has been
done thus far to relate stadium to context with regards to enriching the off-site walking
experience northward to the subway stations, or eastward to the Inner Harbor.
A consideration of the pedestrian experience also factored into the planning of
Cleveland's Gateway project. The north/south on-site street is aligned to connect at the
site's northern boundary with the city's historic downtown arcades (see Figure 6.4). This
arrangement is particularly effective as it will serve to separate the crowds from the
vehicular traffic in the area, and like the Toronto and Baltimore examples, will give those
patrons walking to or from downtown parking or transit facilities an interesting, decidedly
urban experience to associate with their trip to the sports complex.
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Public open space, when planned as part of a stadium project, is also effective in
enhancing the character of the area. In addition to enhancing the civic nature of the
facility, open spaces can be designed to perceptually link the ballpark to the surrounding
areas by responding to views, connections, and sight linesil -a responsiveness that helps
define the stadium's association with its surroundings. The southwest entry to Camden
Yards for example has been configured to accommodate significant flow of pedestrians,
but also presents the "first impression" of the ballpark and of the city from King
Boulevard and from Russell Street approaching directly on axis. 12
The projects also show that open space around a stadium can also provide a
functional tie between stadium and city that helps define its belonging, and adds to the
character and quality of the surrounding area. The City of Toronto for example pushed
Rod Robbie and his architects to plan public plazas for the building edges believing that,
upon full development of the Lands, they will result in maximized public use and interest
in the facility outside of event times. Similarly, the public square that was designed for
the intersection of Russell and Camden Streets on the northwestern corner of Oriole Park
would provide an attractive, useful space for the city's residents, but one that is in part
framed by -and therefore clearly associated with- the ballpark.*
Like the issue of site selection, the scope of stadium urban planning has evolved as a
function of our changing perceptions of cities and of city planning. Stadium projects
need be considered in terms of how the facility itself will interact with surroundings, and
thus how it might positively influence the character of the neighborhood. As both projects
show in their successes and shortcomings, this involves not only consideration of the on-
site features, but demands respect of the dialogue involved: that the surroundings' form
1 1Landscape Architecture: "1991 Awards: The Gateway Project", Landscape Architecture. Nov. 1991, p. 66
12RTKL Associates, Inc., Master Plan Progress Report: Camden Yards Sports Complex Development Plan for the
Maryland Stadium Authority. Nov. 8, 1988, p.4 .19
*At the time of this writing the City had not approved consultants' recommendations to construct the public
space.
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and function, and how they relate to the facility, are integral in determining how a
stadium can enhance our perceptions of the place.
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CHAPTER 7: Capturing Economic Benefits
A point of contention is currently growing between stadium project proponents and
opponents around the economic benefits that such projects may provide for host cities and
states. Government and sports facility officials including those, as we have read, in
Baltimore and Toronto have defended sports facilities projects by suggesting that they
and their tenants provide economic returns far greater than any costs that may be incurred
by the public.
However, given the established tradition of extensive public funding, the number
of stadium projects recently completed and currently under consideration, and their
escalating costs of construction, skeptics have begun to examine and critique such
claims. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the Toronto and Baltimore projects
fair against these criticisms, and to suggest how the projects have -or have not- been
planned and designed maximize their potential returns.
Costs vs. Benefits
Perhaps the central issue in examining the economic impacts of stadia is to understand
their costs to the public relative to their returns. There are several areas of concern here:
the questionable versus actual benefits of stadia, their true costs of their construction, and
the costs of continued operation. Examination of these issues has lead researchers to the
conclusion that "no reasonable expectation of financial benefit could possibly explain
why city official are ready to spend whatever it takes to bring in sports teams."1
1Frieden, Bemard J.; Sagalyn, Lyrne, B.: Downtown. Inc.: How America Rebuilds Cities, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, p. 250
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Questionable Benefits
Perhaps the most frequently heard argument in support of stadium projects is that they
will directly and indirect result in substantial economic activity. "In particular,"
economist Robert Baade points out, "stadium proponents assert that a city's economy will
benefit substantially if a professional sports franchise can be secured [or retained] as a
tenant."2 A substantial component of almost all projections, including the two cases
studied here, is the stadium's resultant "output", or the economic activity "created by
public expenditures." 3
However, such claims assume spending would not have occurred in the absence of
a stadium's construction. Robert Baade's findings lead him to draw an alternative
argument for substitution effect: that the sports spending such as that promoted by
SkyDome and Oriole Park advocates, simply diverts dollars from other activities in other
areas. He cites as evidence a regression analysis (in which the stadium variable
presumably captures the economic multiplier triggered by professional sports) which
demonstrated that stadium renovation or construction, or the adoption of a pro baseball or
football team had an insignificant impact on five of nine cities' incomes, and was actually
followed by a reduction in cities' respective shares of regional income in seven of the nine
cases.4 Thus, for example, SkyDome Vice President David Garrick's contention that the
stadium has led to improved business for area bars and restaurants fails to respect the
plausibility that patrons would most likely be spending their money elsewhere in the city
had the stadium never been built. Baade findings lead him to warn that "the construction
or renovation of a stadium... might well have a positive effect on the economy in the
stadium's immediate neighborhood. But at what cost to the city as a whole?" 5
2Baade, Robert: "Is there Economic Rationale for Subsidizing Sports Stadiums?" Heartland Policy Study. No. 13, Feb.
23, 1987, p. 2
3 Peat Marwick, Mitchell, & Co.: Report on the Economic and Tax Impacts of the Camden Yards Stadium
Development, Mar. 24, 1987, p.8
4 Baade, Feb. 23, 1987, p. 16
5 Donnelly, Harrison: "High Stakes of Sports Economics", Editorial Research Reports, Apr. 8, 1988, p. 180
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In fact, as neither Oriole Park or SkyDome introduces a sports franchise to their
respective cities but simply relocates them, much of the recorded economic impacts of
either new stadium project might be offset to an extent by the losses associated with
relocation. John Connally, Development Advisor the Mayor of Boston, warns of an
"economic infrastructure" of an area crumbling when a team is moved to a different
location -even within the city limits. 6 It seems clear that SkyDome advocates have
overlooked this fact. SkyDome impact figures promoted by Garrick and others 7 for
example, fail to address the adverse economic impact resulting form the baseball team's
move out of Exhibition Stadium.
Similarly, the Maryland Stadium Authority findings, such as the $1.1 billion net
present value of anticipated economic benefits, refer to nt benefits of the two proposed
new stadia (that is, the new two stadium complex less the impact of the abandonment of
Memorial Stadium) 8. But they do not describe what would be the net economic impact of
only the new baseball stadium. This is a critical (and perhaps telling) omission, as it is
entirely plausible (consequent to a failed effort to acquire a football franchise) that the
second stadium will never be built.
Skeptics have also criticized the true benefits of stadia with regards to the
employment opportunities they bring to a city. Figures calculated in the projection of
Oriole Park's benefits, for example, show that 950 full-time equivalent jobs will result
from Camden Yard's construction. 9 Similarly, SkyDome officials estimate that,
considering multipliers, their project will have created 3,000 full and part time jobs.10
The counter argument here is to consider the types of jobs generated by stadium projects:
seasonal, low paying opportunities, such as food and beverage vending, security
6Connally, John, Development Advisor to the Mayor of Boston, Conversation, Nov. 19. 1991
7Pickard, J.L.; Araujo, I.C: "Financing Toronto's SkyDome: A Unique Partnership of Public and Private Funding",
Government Finanace Review, Dec. 1989, P.9
8Peat Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., Mar. 24, 1987, p.2 1
9Peat Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., Mar. 24, 1987, p. 8
10Garrick, p.2
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personnel, and retail sales positions. There is a danger to the respective cities, according
to economists, that"[a]n area development strategy which concentrates on these types of
jobs could lead to a situation where the city gains a comparative advantage in unskilled
and seasonal labor."11
Clear Benefits
Yet there are some economic benefits associated with stadium construction that are less
debatable. Both Toronto's and Baltimore's baseball teams attract a great number of fans
from outside of their respective cities, and the economic impact of these visitors are not
insignificant. In Baltimore, for example, the 18.5% of baseball fans and anticipated 22%
of football fans that come to Camden Yards from out of town will spend $7.7 million
annually in Baltimore. 12
The economic benefits of a stadium may be more appreciable for cities relative to
suburbs. While Robert Baade and other economists warn of the dangers of promoting
low-skill, seasonal jobs, the fact is that many cities are in need of such employment
opportunities. Although these positions might not be appreciated by middle income
suburbanites, they would seemingly provide good second job opportunities for lower
skilled urban adults and for urban youths during the summer and on weekends.
Conversely, siting a stadium in the suburbs makes these employment opportunities less
accessible to the people for whom they might be most beneficial.
The decision to locate stadia in either suburbs or in cities also makes a difference
with regards to a cities' incomes. Depending on the specifics of financial arrangement
behind the stadium project, a stadium may provide a city with substantial tax revenues
-upon which cities are very much in need relative to suburbs. Oriole Park, for example,
was projected to bring in $2 million in non-recurring local tax revenues (associated with
1 1Baade, Robert; Dye, Richard: "The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on Metropolitan Area Development",
Growth and Change, Spring, 1990, p. 7
12 Donnelly, p. 180
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the ballpark's construction) and over $400,000 in local tax revenues annually. 13
SkyDome's contribution has been even more substantial: $13.6 of the $38.8 million in
taxes paid annually by SkyDome go to Metro and City coffers. 14
Many of the benefits of stadium construction are, however, not so visible. The fact
is that, irrespective of whether they truly believe a stadium will bring economic returns,
municipalities carry out stadium projects in pursuit of less tangible rewards. In particular,
there is a perceived city-image associated with professional sports franchises that has led
to the construction of many stadia over the past two decades, both in host cities and in
possible relocation points. To be without a baseball team, it is believed, is to be a second
rate city. "I think any great city in this country has to have a major-league baseball team.
It's part of the American tradition." 15 The argument has not been limited to baseball. "If
you ask people what the great cities in America are, " said the Mayor of Indianapolis in
defense of his pursuit of a football team, "I'll bet 99 out of 100 cite a [National Football
League] city."16
But the "psychic satisfaction" associated with being a "big-league" city impacts
more than the public leaders, affecting the opinions of a large portion of the general
public. In rationalizing public investment of sports facilities, developer Marc Ganis
concludes "I'm not sure that [the view held by some taxpayers] is an entirely correct
vision of the situation... [Professional sports] is something which binds communities -I
don't think you can put a price tag on that."17 Indeed, pro teams bring benefits to cities
that will not appear on a balance sheet; providing role models for local youths, a basis for
city rivalries, and fodder for conversations that bring friends, co-workers, and strangers
closer together. And in addition to providing a range of intangible impacts on urban life,
13Peat Marwick, Mitchell, & Co.,, Mar. 24, 1987, p.15
14 Garrik, David: SkyDome - The Economic Benefits, Stadium Corporation of Ontario, Oct., 1991, p. 6
15 Sagalyn & Frieden, p. 277
16Sagalyn & Frieden, p. 279
17 Engdahl, p. 16
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professional sports speak to a city's character and its pride. "It's like having a first-class
symphony, or a zoo, or any of the luxuries people expect from a big town."18
The issue is therefore whether this big-league status is worth the expenditure of
public funds for new stadia. Politicians certainly think so. At a point in the 1970's where
he was forced to lay off city workers and reduce services, Detroit's Mayor Coleman
Young was able to put together a $5 million grant and a $25 million revenue bond for
renovations to Tiger Stadium that assured the signing of a long-term lease by the baseball
club. Coleman insisted that to lose the Tigers would have been "the death knell for the
city"19, suggesting that he and so many other stadium-backing politicians were merely
protecting the psychological interests of the city. Indeed, many politicians fear that "it is
almost worse for a city's image to lose a major league team than to have never had one at
all"20 and that the image must be protected.
More likely, officials back stadium projects because it makes political sense to do
so. The popularity of teams is such, according to the some, that to lose a franchise during
one's administration would be political suicide. Furthermore, "the politicians are usually
not around to take the blame when the bills come due."21 But neither is submitting to
team pressures a uniformly popular move. Since 1986, voters in San Francisco and
Cleveland among other cities have rejected bond issues when placed on referendums;
suggesting that while the image associated with professional sports and stadia is valued
by communities, the price people are willing to pay is not always unlimited.
Hidden Costs
Another aspect of assessing the net cost of stadia for municipalities is to understand the
true economic costs at the outset. The common form of funding has been public outlays
18Knack, Ruth, "Stadiums: The Right Game Plan?" Planning. October, 1986, p.11
19Sagalyn & Frieden, p. 27 7
2 0Sagalyn & Frieden, p. 277
2 1Bames, p. 26
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of funds, but as the era of the publicly funded stadium matures, the form of financial
responsibility has taken many shapes. Marc Ganis, a leader in private-sector involvement
in stadium projects, concedes that while variations have evolved from the simple cutting
of a check, "in most projects you need some forms of public-sector assistance." 22 Miami's
Joe Robbie Stadium, touted as a model for future private-sector initiatives, was in fact
built on land donated by the county. Similarly, the minimal direct, public sector financing
of both SkyDome and Camden does not fully represent the cost of the project borne by
the respective municipalities; and suggest that cities must be careful to minimize their
exposure beyond simple cash outlays.
In Toronto, the public expense as initially estimated was minimal. In an era of
public funding of stadium projects, the initiative of Trevor Eyton and the private sector
consortium was almost revolutionary; the private sector outlay of $60 million being far
less than that of other municipalities in recent past. Indeed, in defense of SkyDome's
price, architect Rod Robbie points out that the municipalities, according to initial
estimates, would generate a net gain on the project; their $60 million in return for over
$100 million dollars worth of infrastructure.
Yet, omitted from all of the favorable analyses of the deal at the time of
consummation was recognition of the high risk borne by the public: in return for the
reduced cash outlay, the Provincial government would pay for construction cost overruns,
officially projected as $23 million dollars at groundbreaking. But according to
SkyDome's David Garrick, no one truly believed the project would cost under $300
million23 -a difference of $67 million over the original estimate likely to be targeted for
the absorption. More importantly, the guarantee allowed the private sector interest to
elaborate on the project with the reassurance that the public would ultimately be held
financially responsible. While Garrick insists the late program additions were an attempt
22 Engdahl, Lora: "Purusing Private Development: The Ganis Game Plan", Facility Manager, Summer, 1985, p. 11
23 Garrick, conversation, Jan. 28, 1992
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to assure long-term increases in the stadium's operating revenues,24 Stephen
McLaughlin's represents a more widely held opinion. "The province basically gave them
a blank check, so they got carried away with [the program]."25 The cost of the public's
guarantee would not be fully understood until the project was completed -at over $300
million over budget. Thus the trade of low initial outlay in return for the guarantee ended
up being a bad deal for the public: They paid at least as much as they would have had a
stadium project been totally publicly financed and controlled, but in this deal had no say
about the spending of tax dollars, hold only 51% equity in the facility, and will likely sell
this interest in an effort to reduce their debt.
The Baltimore case is another example of the fact that public interest can take
several forms beyond the simple cutting of a check , and that such costs should not be
discounted. Indeed the use of revenue bonds, the interest of which will be paid primarily
by proceeds from a state lottery, seems relatively benign. As the Stadium Authority's Ed
Cline points out, residents who do not wish to subsidize the stadium have the option not
to do so, since their tax dollars were not being relied upon. However, it is the opportunity
cost with which taxpayers will be burdened, as the lottery proceeds ($92.2 million at the
time of this writing)26 are not going to the state general treasury, where most lottery
revenues go. As State Senator Howard A. Denis (R-Montgomery), a staunch opponent of
the stadium project warns, the diversion of lottery revenues to the bonds "leaves a hole
that has to be filled from some other source-the taxpayer."27
The use of revenue bonds by the Maryland Stadium Authority reflects a growing
trend in public finance away from the school of thought that "taxing and spending
decisions ought to be clear and open" 28 towards a practice of off-budget financing, where
long-term projects avoid competition with other municipal demands for limited tax
2 4Garrick, conversation, Jan. 28, 1992
2 5McLaughlin, conversation, Jan. 27, 1992
2 6 Valentine, Paul: "Residents Worry Oriole Park Won't be Friendly Neighbor", Washington Post, March 30, 1992, p.
C1
27Valentine, p. .C8
2 8Frieden & Sagalyn : p. 250
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dollars by relying on funding sources (tax increments, parking revenues) that do not have
to receive voter approval. Such tactics are defended based on the delayed payoffs usually
associated with the projects; they are means of giving cities "a chance to build complex
projects for the sake of future benefits." 29 To the extent that actual economic benefits will
ultimately result from Camden Yards, this may represent a justifiable procedure, but as
suggested earlier, many of the reported long-term benefits of preceding stadia are
dubious. On the other hand, it is clear that off-budget financing was sought because "[it]
escape the hard looks and cold calculations reserved for cash outlays" 30 but, as the
depletion of lottery revenues proves, still comes at a cost to taxpayers.
The net benefits of stadium projects are also compromised, as the Baltimore case
suggests, by costs likely to be borne by taxpayers that are not accounted for in the final
tabulations. The final construction cost for Oriole Park has been officially totaled as
$106.5 million,3 1 $1.1 million over the pre-construction estimate. 32 What is, however, not
accounted for in the total are $99 million in property acquisition and relocation costs, and
$9.6 million in infrastructure paid directly by the city -both of which represent hidden
costs to taxpayers, according to stadium opponents. 33 Baltimore city planner Evans Paull
adds to this the write-down by the City of properties to which businesses relocated, in
supplement of insufficient Stadium Authority relocation allowances.34 There is no doubt
in the city administration's opinion that, merely in terms of hidden costs, "[Baltimore]
has heavily invested in the new stadium." 35
Costly Operations
29 Frieden & Sagalyn, p. 250
30 Frieden & Sagalyn, p. 249
3 1Valentine, p. C8
32 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. New Downtown BallPark to Open i n '92, Baltimore Orioles, Inc., p.1
33 Valentine, p. C8
34 Paull, conversation, Jan. 24, 1992
35 Valentine, p. C8
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In addition to hidden costs, the continued operation of stadia have proven to be a
continued financial burden to taxpayers. Here, economists have reserved special criticism
for dome facilities: that, contrary to their advocates assertions of flexible programming
and year-round availability, dome projects are not only a financial burden because of
their tremendous construction costs, but few -if truly any- can operate annually at a profit.
The Houston Astrodome, modestly priced by today's standards, must be booked 150 days
out of the year in order not to operate at an annual deficit, 36 while the Superdome in New
Orleans has been subsidized by tax payers -as much as $12 million- every year since
opening.37
This scenario, according to some, is the result of a waning novelty of domes that
has reduced their allurement for both patrons and events, and of an inability of facilities
to secure enough 'dates' to operate profitably given the growing number of competing
venues.38 A perverse example of this dilemma is the St. Petersburg, Florida Sun Coast
Dome, built in 1988 to attract a major-league baseball club, but four years later is still
without a major tenant.
Toronto's SkyDome does not present a solution to this quandary, but rather
suggests a reiteration of the dilemma at the next level. SkyDome is merely to the 1990's
what the Astrodome was to the 1960's: a sports venue designed to reap profits by offering
conditions that others cannot. Indeed, as is asserted in Chapter 3, the city's push for a
fixed roof facility gradually disappeared as their novelty wore. And investors demanded
that any project they funded have a retractable roof in order that it be "like no other in the
world."39
As suspected, and as the previously mentioned "dome factor" implies, SkyDome
is operating at an annual profit largely because of its (and not events') allurement. The
3 6Baade, Feb. 23, 1987, p. 8
37 Barnes, John A.: "Home Sweet Dome", The Washington Monthly, Feb. 1988, p. 2 5
3 8Lancaster, Michael: "Stadium Projects Proliferating Amidst Debate Over Benefits to Cities", Wall Street Journal,
Mar.20, 1987, p.3 7
39 Filey, Mike, Like No Other in the World. The Story of Toronto's SkyDome Sun Controlled Ventures Inc., Toronto,
1989, p. 7
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question of course is the extent to which this effect will last, given the example set by
domes in the previous iteration of stadia concepts. Several cities have contemplated
building retractable roof stadia Rod Robbie himself has had discussions with officials in
several American cities concerning such projects, and has been contracted to design six
venues in Japan. 40 SkyDome's novelty, and thus dome factor, and profitability, are
therefore in jeopardy of following the path previously set by once-unique fixed-roof
facilities.
But neither are such open-air stadia as Oriole Park exempt from burdening
taxpayers. Playing on the fears of losing their teams, municipalities have historically
negotiated lease arrangements with tenant teams so favorable that, irrespective of facility
type, they will fail to see operating revenues. In Baltimore, despite having been built a
new facility, the Orioles were able to carry over the lease arrangement from Memorial
Stadium 41 whereby the Orioles share any net operating profits with the State in profitable
years, but pay no rent if the team does not generate a net operating profit.42 In other cases,
lease arrangements have actually cost municipalities money. The City of Philadelphia
was forced to build 23 skyboxes and a new outfield scoreboard for the baseball Phillies,
at a cost of nearly $3 million , in order to secure a long-term lease.43 In a more unique
case, the New York Yankees negotiated a lease arrangement whereby they were allowed
to deduct maintenance costs from their rent; maintenance costs were subsequently pushed
to such a high level that the team wound up billing the City annually for "negative
rent."44
Planning for Economic Benefits
4 0 Robbie, Roderick, conversation, Jan. 30, 1992
4 1Maryland Stadium Authority; Baltimore Orioles, Inc.: Memorandum of Agreement Between the Maryland Stadium
Authority and Baltimore Orioles. Inc., May 2, 1988, p. 5
4 2 Baade, Feb. 23, 1987, p. 9
4 3 Baade, Feb. 23, 1987, p. 10
44Frieden & Sagalyn, p. 278
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While economists insist that the economic benefits trumpeted by stadium advocates are
dubious, one must respect that fact that cities throughout North America will continue to
pursue stadia projects; pursuing both these dubious benefits and the big-league or 'world-
class' status45 that drove the SkyDome and Camden Yards projects, and so many before
them. Robert Baade argues that, consequently, if stadia projects are to be undertaken,
their economic liabilities demand planning in a fashion whereby their potential economic
benefits are maximized.46 While the two projects studied here reflect the economic
liabilities mentioned above, so too do they suggest ways for which this maximization of
benefits can be planned.
An oversight of most stadium impact projections is the failure to consider the
opportunity cost associated with promoting sports: That doing so "will encourage a
development character in a city different than that of the region of which the city is a
part."47 It cannot be assumed in most cases that a city is better served in the long term,
according to Baade, by sports and stadium-related economic growth than by that taking
shape in the rest of the region. While no such 'opportunity-cost' projections are provided
by either Baltimore or Toronto stadium advocates, this warning would suggest that both
cities provided the seemingly appropriate economic 'landscapes' in which to build stadia.
The City of Baltimore, for example, had been revitalizing and redefining its
downtown as a culture and tourism hub for nearly 15 years prior to the ballpark's
construction; downtown had long since distinguished itself from the region economically.
In fact, Evan Paull's assertion that the City has been searching to increase its tourism
appeal suggests that they sought further differentiation, and that Oriole Park was merely a
well-timed opportunity to do so. Similarly, Toronto has long been defined as the tourism
4 5 Lancaster, Hal: "Stadium Projects are Proliferating Amid Debates Over Benefit to Cities", Wall Street Journal, Mar.
20, 1987, p. 37
4 6 Baade, Robert, Dye, Richard: "Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Critical Review", Economic Development
Quarterly. V.2, No. 3, Aug., 1988, p. 272
4 7 Baade& Dye, Aug., 1988, p. 13
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and culture capital of Ontario; SkyDome was proposed in part as a reflection of a
direction in which Toronto's image and economy has been developing.
Subsequent to the rationale of building both stadia is the economic sensibility of
locating them downtown. Evans Paull, in defending the selection of the Camden Yards
site, contends that a suburban alternative would have automatically resulted in less
substantial -and more diffuse- economic spin-offs. Given the typical suburban stadium
model, "who's going to go out of the 15,000 car parking lot to a neighborhood bar, then
walk back to their car?" 48 Irrespective of the parking, suburban locales are less likely to
have commercial land uses to attract such patrons. As a consequence, stadium patrons are
likely to stop on their ways home at some indeterminable location -if at all.
Baade and others thus contend that the optimization of a sports facility's economic
benefits requires that such patrons be 'captured' -that "it is essential to counterbalance this
tendency of [stadium patrons] to leave the stadium neighborhood immediately after the
game." 49 In response, Oriole Park and SkyDome are located in optimal locations, as the
pedestrian nature of their cities' urban fabrics provide varieties of nearby opportunities to
spend money before and after visiting the stadia. Furthermore, the site planning of both
will serve to maximize the exposure of stadium traffic to the respective areas: SkyDome
provides virtually no on-site parking, while Camden Yards' designers relegated parking to
the area of the site far removed from commercial activity.
While the urban environment may be most suitable for maximizing economic
spin-offs, to simply retro-fit a stadia in an urban location (irrespective of its design and
layout) is insufficient. "While stadium 'trickle-down' benefits to the neighborhood
represent an important component of the orthodox stadium rationale, it is rarely
represented as more than a vague promise."50 Instead of assuming -or hoping for- these
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4 8Paull, conversation, Jan. 20, 1992
49 Baade & Dye, Aug., 1988, p. 273
50 Baade & Dye, Aug., 1988, p. 273
returns, economists have insisted that urban stadium plans be broadened in scope to
support ancillary development.
The extensive revisions by Toronto's planners of the Railway Lands plan in
accordance with SkyDome's siting is an excellent example of an application of this
rationale. For one, the rationalization of planned land uses in the area surrounding the
dome is a direct response to the opportunity to capture stadium traffic, as commercial
activity will line key pedestrian routes and will thereby help to maximize economic
activity. However, the most critical aspect of the Railway Lands' ultimate ability to
capture economic spin-offs from SkyDome is the maintenance of plans for mixed uses.
Baade has found that "the integration of a variety of commercial activities to include the
stadium is generally not sufficient to ensure [economic] success." 51 Commercial uses
require far more traffic than is generated in daily and seasonal spurts by stadia. Thus,
despite popular criticisms of the idea, residential development, particularly high density
development such as that planned for the Railway Lands near SkyDome, is integral to
exacting returns for stadia, as it will provide a balanced, more substantial demand for
businesses.
While the aggressive planning of the Railway Yards appears to be a model of
economists recommendations, there appear to be two ways to interpret the laissez-faire or
"incremental" 52 approach taken to the planning of the area surrounding Oriole Park. One
interpretation is that contrary to the Toronto case, City planners in Baltimore missed the
opportunity to maximize the returns of the stadium by "naively assum[ing] that the
ballpark will spontaneously generate development", 53 and as such does not represent a
good example of an attempt to capture the economic benefits of a stadium. The passive
response of the City's Planning Department is indeed peculiar. Given the successful
history of the Baltimore's planning initiatives, one would suspect that the City would have
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5 2 Paull, conversation, Jan. 20, 1992
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approached the project with a stadium-oriented planning initiative. Furthermore,
recognizing that successful stadium planning requires consideration of both site and
surroundings, planners who had conducted on-site master planning efforts for the
Maryland Stadium Authority expressed frustration at the restriction of their study area to
the strict boundaries of the stadium-site -and were indeed surprised at the city's apparent
apathy. 54
A more favorable evaluation of he Baltimore planning response is, however,
equally plausible. Baade's and others' warnings that planning a stadium independent of
the context would be irresponsible presumes that no plan is in place at the time of the
stadium projects conception, or that any existing plans are inappropriate for a stadium.
To the contrary in Baltimore, urban redevelopment plans for the adjacent Market Center
West and Inner Harbor West areas were implemented long before Oriole Park at Camden
Yards evolved, and these plans in fact appear to satisfy the economists' criteria. As Paull
suggested, the Market Center West is comprised of land use designations and zoning
classifications that permit stadium-related development, particularly along the pedestrian
paths of stadium access and egress between the site and subway stops. The plan also calls
for a retention of the mix of residential and commercial properties that will allow the
latter to benefit form the ballpark's location, but also to have a viability independent of it.
Thus, in suggesting that the ballpark will allow this plan to "fill in", city officials may be
suggesting that sites for unspectacular, mixed-use redevelopment plans provide an
existing environment appropriate for capturing economic gains of stadia.
There are, nonetheless, clear examples of where the City's failure to let the
stadium dictate the planning of its surroundings will adversely affect the potential for
spin-offs from the stadium. For one of the vacant lot immediately north of the ballpark
(Figure 7.1), proposals have been submitted for a 664,000 SF office building, in which no
54 Huhn, Barry, Associate, RTKL Associates, Inc., Conversation, Jan. 22, 1992
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Figure. 7.1
Lots 1, 2, 3 and B are currently vacant; The Convention Center is proposing to expand from Lot A
(Baltimore Development Corporation)
street-oriented activity will be provided, 55 while development of the other, adjacent lots is
likely to consist of convention center expansion. Indeed, while the vacancy of four
blocks of land around Camden Yards seems to provide the perfect scenario for
implementing plans and guidelines directed at maximizing ancillary development, there
do not appear to be any such initiatives in place.
The location of Oriole Park and SkyDome downtown were also economically wise
decisions given the make-up of both teams' patrons. As mentioned, Baade and other
economists are skeptical of stadium proponents economic benefit estimates given the
5 5Brose, Shubroto, Director of Architecture and Urban Design, City of Baltimore Development Corporation,
conversation, Jan. 24, 1992.
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likelihood of a leisure-dollar reallocation factor. Rather, "in standard development
models, local growth comes from increased export sales- net inflows of spending from
outside the area."56 Here we see the logic of Evan Paull's "critical mass" concept: As the
Orioles and Blue Jays are both regional attractions, drawing more fans regularly from
outside the metropolitan area than average, they possess a potential to provide substantial
export sales for their respective cities.
Building the facilities downtown, proximal to other attractions and to hotels,
would seem to optimize this potential. David Garrick, makes this point in referring to the
impact of SkyDome on area hotel business. Thus, were the facilities never constructed,
and (certainly in the Baltimore case) the teams subsequently relocated to other cities, the
large number of fans who came to games would most likely spend their leisure dollars at
home. Were they not built downtown near hotels and other attractions, the net exports
would not likely have been maximized.
In assessing the economic impacts of both stadium projects, it is clear that both the
Camden Yards and SkyDome are susceptible to the criticisms that have been levied
against preceding stadium projects. Both projects project economic benefits that are
questionable, and both hold extensive costs not initially or overtly targeted for taxpayers.
However, both projects, despite their aesthetic and functional differences, also provide
examples of how to help counter economic liabilities through thoughtful considerations of
what ought to be a stadium's location and how it ought to be organized.
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5 6Baade & Dye p. 1
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Cities across North America will be facing the question of whether to build a new
stadium. In examining the planning of two possible prototypes for future stadia, and
based on both their assets and shortcomings, this author has attempted to provide insight
into key issues associated with planning professional sports facilities for the urban
environment.
Camden Yards has rightfully been widely praised for its reintroduction of
traditional ballpark aesthetic. Its eccentric shape and decidedly urban scale are in stark
contrast to the megastructure aesthetic applied to predecessors. It successfully reflects
both an aesthetic reminiscent of the most beloved era and that of its host environment
-reminding us that stadia were initially conceived and designed as urban buildings, and
suggests that for no reason should this idea no longer apply. The Camden Yards Sports
Complex represents an aesthetic, functional and economically feasible alternative to the
forgettable modern and post-war stadium models.
SkyDome provides us with a concept of the multi-purpose, domed stadium that
defies our established conceptions. Its technological wizardry and modem appearance are
an intriguing peek at what could be the future of sports facilities. As a prototype, it is also
informative particularly from an urban planning perspective in that it suggests that
notions of applying urban design guidelines to a stadium should not be prejudiced upon
the type of facility that is being constructed. Furthermore, despite its shortcomings in
achieving the design sought by McLaughlin, SkyDome reminds us that a stadium need
not reflect the old city in seeking urbanity, but may be ultimately successful by
responding to the city of tomorrow.
In addition, both projects show that a successful "urban" stadium goes beyond
aesthetic considerations for which these facilities are so commonly judged, to suggest
how sports facilities mightfunction as urban uses. Perhaps the singularly most important
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preconception dispelled by both of these projects is that stadia are single purpose
monoliths, and in this sense inappropriate for the urban setting. SkyDome and Oriole Park
suggest that this singularity need not be carried over from the antiquated era of planning
from which it was born. Both respect their settings by incorporating decidedly urban mix
of activities, and in how these activities were allocated and could have been allocated
suggest how stadia might enhance their sense of belonging while positively enforcing the
character of the host environment.
The functional and physical fit of a sports facility into the urban environment is,
however, a two way process. As important as it is for stadia to be planned in respect of
their host environments, so too is it important, as these projects have shown, or the city to
respond in kind if their is to be an optimal coexistence. Although the success of their
own efforts is debatable, Toronto city planners have put forward the notions that the built
form can be planned in response to a facility in efforts to optimize economic spin-offs and
to enhance the sense of place, and that the association of the experience of attending an
event with the experience of going to an event need not be restricted to traditional-style
ballparks. Similarly, while Oriole Park, as mentioned, successfully advances the concept
of planning a ballpark in response to the city, this case leads one to question the ultimate
virtues of such efforts if the city is allowed to subsequently turns its back on the facility,
both functionally and physically.
Furthermore, cities' responsibilities go beyond planning considerations to
adopting an economically responsible frame of mind in undertaking these projects. While
considerations of the surrounding environment can return economic dividends, cases
cited in this thesis also warn against overconfidence and subsequent overexposure of
municipalities to economic costs.
In sum, both Oriole Park and SkyDome demonstrate that stadia can be planned in
synergy with the urban environment; both the long established city and that which is yet
to come. It is clear, based on these divergent cases, that urban environments and stadia
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can have much to offer each other. As this thesis described, this potential harmony relates
to issues ranging from economics to compatibility of land uses and ancillary services to
fostering a sense of place. In both their accomplishments and shortcomings, the cases
demonstrate that stadia ought not be relegated to the suburbs by definition. Rather, they
show that if subjected to urban constraints, located in appropriate urban settings, and
planned in coordination with their environments, a stadium can be a welcome,
appropriate addition to the urban environment.
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